How to Avoid 2020 Online Shopping Threats

The shopping season is upon us and as in previous years, cybercriminals are preparing multiple ways to target the online shopping community, including phishing attempts to steal financial details, malspam campaigns distributing malware and more. In fact, while examining the credit card trade in the Dark Web during 2019, we discovered that the highest number of stolen cards offered for sale on dedicated marketplaces was in November 2019 with over 32M cards, although we should take in consideration that there are duplications of data, since it is likely that cybercriminals will try to sell the stolen data in multiple marketplaces.

In this post we will provide you with some tips for ensuring a secure shopping spree and we will also take a look at recent attacks and how attack groups operate to target online shoppers and vendors.

Are you shopping online this season? Here are essential Do’s and Don’ts for you:

  • Be extra aware of phishing attacks, especially with emails requesting you to verify or update your account details, register to get a free item or a coupon, etc.
  • Verify the URL address of the platform you are about to buy from – make sure the URL address of the official website of the desired brand.
  • Check that the platform you are shopping on to purchase goods is secured – look for an HTTPS URL, a trusted certificate, etc.
  • Do not open attachments sent from unknown sources, especially ones requesting to enable macro or editing permissions in order to open them.
  • Avoid clicking on ads of any kind, especially during the shopping season.
  • Do not download apps from unofficial App stores, especially shopping-themed apps.
  • Check apps permissions and update your mobile operating system on a regular basis.
  • Use 2FA or OTP protocols if provided by the service vendor.

What you see isn’t always what you get: Scam Websites and Fake Domains

Fake domains of popular brands can be used in spam or phishing campaigns that are carried out via mail, SMS, social media platforms and more. In last year’s shopping season, 124,000 suspicious domains were detected, abusing names of 26 brands. The most targeted brands were Apple, Amazon and Target.

This year, we researched how many domains with the word “Amazon” were registered during the first week of November 2020. We detected over 600 of recently registered domains with no official connection to Amazon in their registration details. Although it seems that many of them are not yet “operational”, as they do not lead to an active website, some of them sure look suspicious, for example: verification-amazonservices.com (detected as a phishing website via several AVs), account-verificationamazon.com, amazon-login-verify.com (detected as suspicious by one AV) and even amazon-black-friday.com (first created in 2010 and is being re-registered each year since then).

Scam websites usually use a similar web design and interface to the legitimate online shopping platforms, and therefore it is recommended to check the website’s domain or URL address before purchasing goods using your credit card.

A fake website of Taobao, a Chinese online shopping platform (the upper one) and the legitimate website (bottom)

Keep your systems updated to avoid E-skimming attacks (AKA: Magecart attacks)

E-skimming is one of the most popular ways these days to carry out credit card fraud. Cybercriminals usually exploit a vulnerability in the e-commerce or online payment platform (usually in third parties’ components), in order to inject a malicious code that will capture the user’s credit card data and send it the its operators. Once they hold the data, cybercriminals will probably sell it in the Dark Web or use it to make additional purchases.

Magecart is the name given for this type of attack and to cybercriminals that usually target platforms running outdated versions of Magento (while exploiting flaws, such as CVE-2017-7391 and CVE-2016-4010 in Magento) and use a malicious JavaScript code embedded into the compromised platform. In fact, Magecart attacks are so common that in September 2020, it was reported that approximately 2,000 e-commerce platforms were targeted in one weekend.

Additional ways to carry out e-skimming attacks are by accessing the e-commerce network, using administrative credentials. These can be obtained via phishing, brute-force attacks, or a cross-site scripting attack that redirects users to a malicious website with a JavaScript code. Access to networks of online shopping platforms are also traded on Dark Web forums, allowing threat actors to gain access to databases containing users’ details.

Cybercriminal offers access to a shopping platform on the Dark Web. This can be also used for e-skimming attacks. Source: Verint LUMINAR

Of note, nation-state groups were also spotted using this attack vector in the wild. In July 2020, researchers found that the North Korean group Lazarus was behind a serial of Magecart-style attacks against multiple e-commerce stores around the world.

Therefore, it is vital for organizations that operate online payment platforms to keep them updated and secured. We really can’t stress this enough. It is also recommended to use tools that will help detect such malicious injections and monitor suspicious activities in order to block them on time.

The spamming season: Spam campaigns are used for malware distribution

In the shopping season of 2018, a massive spam campaign distributing Emotet, targeted online shoppers worldwide, especially in North and Latin America and the UK. Emotet is an infamous malware, active since 2014, that was first detected as a banking Trojan, but these days it is often used as a downloader or a dropper for additional Trojans or even ransomware. It is usually distributed via worldwide spam campaigns and malicious attachments that request users to unable Macros. During last year’s shopping season, approximately 130 million malware attacks and ~640,000 ransomware attacks were detected in the US. Based on what we’ve seen in the past few years, it is expected that malware operators will try to lure victims via shopping-themed emails and malicious attachments.

The world goes mobile: The rise in malicious mobile apps

Each year, malicious shopping-themed apps target unaware users during the shopping season, which is why it is recommended to download mobile apps from official platforms and to check the reviews. However, in January 2020, a new Trojan dubbed “Shopper” was spotted leaving fake applications reviews on Google Play, on behalf of the infected device’s owner, leaving users with no trust in apps rating. The Trojan was also detected turning off the Google Play Protect feature, in order to download additional apps without safety checks, using the victim’s Google or Facebook account to register to popular shopping and entertainment apps, spreading advertisements, etc. Infections were spotted worldwide, including in Russia, Brazil and India.

Additional malicious shopping season-themed Android apps were spotted in 2019 luring users with coupons, discounts and other shopping hacks. Some of them were detected sending sensitive information from the infected devices to their operators or containing adware used to spread malicious advertisements.

To conclude, the shopping season is open for all, including cybercriminals who are trying to maximize their gain. Awareness is the key when it comes to what shoppers can do to keep safe, whereas vendors need to take additional measures during these times to avoid financial loss, reputational damage and customer abandonment.

ARE RUSSIAN CYBERCRIMINALS OFFERING HACKING SERVICES IN CHINA ?

On July 27, 2020, a group of threat actors published a post in the advertisement section of a prominent Chinese Darknet marketplace offering hacking services. Hacking-as-a-service offers appear frequently on Chinese underground platforms, and many actors publish these services – accompanied by varying degrees of details – on both Clearnet hacking forums and Darknet marketplaces. However, what makes this offer unique is the identification of the actors, who claim to be Russian.

WHAT INDICATES THAT THE HACKERS ARE REALLY RUSSIAN ?

  1. Several linguistic features suggest the actors are indeed non-native Chinese speakers. First, they use anachronistic vocabulary and terms rarely seen in contemporary Chinese online chatter, which is common on these forums. Two examples are the use of the term 万维网 for “World Wide Web,” and the rare version of the word “hacker” 骇客 (pronounced haike, instead of the commonly used term 黑客, pronounced heike); Second, some sentences are oddly phrased, using a combination of wrong vocabulary and/or unnatural syntax or formulation, giving the impression the text was translated from a foreign language, possibly via a machine-translation tool; Third, there are linguistic inconsistencies in the group’s posts on the forum: whereas most of the posts are written in simplified Chinese characters, used in mainland China, one is written in traditional Chinese characters, used in Taiwan and Hong Kong – this transition by the same writer is very uncommon. Furthermore, different variations of the same word or term are used simultaneously in the same post.
  2. Contact details include several Telegram, QQ and Jabber accounts, with the former two widely used by Chinese cybercriminals and hackers selling their services. However, in addition to those, they also offer their services via Yandex email service, which is rarely used outside of Russia and the former Soviet Union countries, and even less so by Chinese users. This corroborates the assumption that these actors are not Chinese, and may indeed be Russian, as they claim to be.
The post from July 27, offering “high quality hacking services”, as appeared on the Chinese Darknet marketplace. The sentence highlighted in yellow reads: “we come from Russia”. Source: Verint LUMINAR

THE THREAT ACTORS’ OFFERING

The hacking services on offer are listed in more detail in another post by the same threat actors, published on this marketplace on June 15, 2020. The list of services includes:

  • Web penetration and data extraction. The actors state they have mastered the structure and special features of the main database types, such as MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle and PostgreSQL.
  • Obtaining web shells by exploiting major vulnerabilities, such as CMS, WP and Joomla, among others.
  • Cracking of software and encrypted files; secondary packaging and unpacking.
  • Software and source code secondary development.
  • Various web security-related services, such as penetration tests, code design, vulnerability scanning, emergency response, alerts and web security training, among others.
The post from June 15 listing the services this group offers. Unlike other posts by these actors, this post was written in Traditional Chinese characters. Source: Verint LUMINAR

In addition to these two posts offering hacking and web-security services, in two other posts from May and June 2020, these actors also offer for sale, bots for boosting the number of “friends” and “followers” on social media networks, as well as SMS-bombing services and tools.

Finally, in recent months, we have noticed an increasing trend of Chinese threat actors operating on non-Chinese platforms. They typically use their linguistic skills and familiarity with Chinese underground platforms to make easy profits by offering data sold exclusively on Chinese platforms (usually Darknet marketplaces and Telegram groups) on English-language platforms outside China for a higher price. However, it is highly unusual to see non-Chinese actors actively operating on Chinese-language platforms. If the actors’ claim of being Russian is indeed correct, this is a relatively novel and unusual phenomenon worth noting.

Source Code of Ratopak/Pegasus Spyware Targeting the Financial Sector Recently Leaked

On July 6, 2018, a post claiming to contain the source code of Carbanak group malware was published on a Russian-speaking underground forum. Soon after the sharing of the code on the Russian underground, it was uploaded by an unknown actor to the text-sharing platform Pastebin, making it accessible to all. At the same time, malware researchers analyzing the shared code discovered the malware is not one used by the Carbanak group, but rather, it is the Ratopak/Pegasus spyware, used in attacks against Russian banks in 2016. Continue reading “Source Code of Ratopak/Pegasus Spyware Targeting the Financial Sector Recently Leaked”

TOO SOON TO PATCH? – TIMESPAN FROM EXPOSURE TO ATTACK

This is an excerpt from the SenseCy 2017 Annual Report. To receive the full version of the report, please contact us at CyberThreat.Insider@verint.com

In the past year, the number of disclosed vulnerabilities (14,712) reached an all-time peak in all of cyber-history – twice as high as the two previous years: 6,480 vulnerabilities were Continue reading “TOO SOON TO PATCH? – TIMESPAN FROM EXPOSURE TO ATTACK”

The Shade (Troldesh) Ransomware: One More Soldier in the Army of Encryption Miscreants

Written by Mickael S. and Tanya K.

Last week, SenseCy analysts happened upon a new sample of Shade ransomware, also known as Troldesh, which uses a no_more_ransom extension for encrypted files. This ransomware is far from famous, lacking the glorious Continue reading “The Shade (Troldesh) Ransomware: One More Soldier in the Army of Encryption Miscreants”

Russian Cyber Criminal Underground – 2015: The Prosperity of Ransomware and Office Exploits

The prominent products traded during 2015 on Russian underground forums were Ransomware programs and exploits targeting Microsoft Office. Prices on the Russian Underground have remained unchanged during the past two years, due to the vigorous competition between sellers on these platforms. Different kinds of services, such as digital signing for malicious files, injections development for MitM attacks and Crypting malware to avoid detection were also extremely popular on Russian forums.

Check out the new Infographic from SenseCy illustrating key trends observed on Russian underground in 2015.

Please contact us to receive your complimentary 2015 SenseCy Annual Cyber Threat Intelligence Report: https://www.sensecy.com/contact

Russian_underground_final

Handling a Ransomware Attack

A recent wave of ransomware attacks has hit countries around the world, with a large number of infections reported in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Israel. It appears that the attackers have no specific target, since the attacks have struck hospitals, financial institutions and private institutions, indicating that no specific industry has been targeted.

In Israel, two types of ransomware were identified in the most recent attacks: the familiar TeslaCrypt and the new ransomware, Locky.

The Evolution of Ransomware

The vigorous usage of ransomware tools by cybercriminals and their success in this area has led to the development of new ransomware and the constant upgrading of known models. During the past several months, researchers have reported on the development of ransomware that is capable of file encryption without Internet connection, i.e., they do not communicate with their C&C servers for the encryption process.

New ransomware tools that were reported are Locky ransomware, whose modus operandi resembles the Dridex banking Trojan, and a new version of CTB-Locker that attacks web servers.

Additionally, RaaS (Ransom-as-a-Service) offers are becoming popular on closed DeepWeb and Darknet forums. These services allow potential attackers to easily create ransomware stubs, paying with profits from future successful infections. Recently, we identified a new RaaS dubbed Cerber ransomware, which is offered on a Russian underground forum. Previously it was ORX-Locker, offered as a service via a platform hosted on an .onion server.

1
The ransom message presented by the Cerber ransomware

Ransomware Distribution

The majority of the distribution vectors of ransomware stubs involve some kind of social engineering trap, for example, email messages including malicious Office files, spam messages with nasty links or malvertising campaigns exploiting vulnerable WordPress or Joomla websites with an embedded malevolent code. The distribution also takes advantage of Macro commands and exploit kits, such as Nuclear or Angler. Sometimes browser vulnerabilities are exploited, as well as stolen digital certificates.

In November 2015, attempts to deliver ransomware to Israeli clients were identified. In this case, the attackers spoofed a corporate email address and tried to make recipients believe the email was sent from a company worker.

2
RaaS offered on a Darknet forum

Handling a Ransomware Attack

Please find below our suggestions for recommended action to avoid ransomware attacks on an organization, and how to deal with an attack after infection:

Defend Your Organization from Potential Threats

  • Train your employees – since the human link is the weakest link in the organizational cybersecurity and the majority of the cases involve social engineering on one of the employees, periodical employee briefing is extremely important. Specify the rules regarding using the company systems, and describe what phishing messages look like.
  • Raise awareness regarding accepting files that arrive via email messages – instruct your employees not to open suspicious files or files sent from unfamiliar senders. Consider implementing an organizational policy addressing such files. We recommend blocking or isolating files with the following extensions: js (JavaScript), jar (Java), bat (Batch file), exe (executable file), cpl (Control Panel), scr (Screensaver), com (COM file) and pif (Program Information file).
  • Disable running of Macro scripts on Office files sent via email – in recent months, many cases of ransomware attacks employing this vector were reported. Usually, Macro commands are disabled by default and we do not recommend enabling them. In addition, we suggest using Office Viewer software to open Word and Excel files.
  • Limit user privileges and constantly monitor the workstations – careful management of user privileges and limited administrator’s privileges may help in avoiding the spread of the ransomware in the organizational network. Moreover, monitoring the activity on workstations will be useful for early detection of any infection and blocking it from propagating to other systems and network resources.
  • Create rules that block programs from executing from AppData/LocalAppData folders. Many variants of the analyzed ransomware are executed from these directories, including CryptoLocker. Therefore, the creation of such rules may reduce the encryption risk significantly.
  • Install a Russian keyboard – while monitoring closed Russian forums where several ransomware families originated, we discovered that many of them will check if the infected computer is located in a post-Soviet country. Usually, this check is performed by detecting which keyboard layout is installed on the machine. If a Russian (or other post-Soviet language) keyboard layout is detected, the ransomware will not initiate the encryption process.
  • Keep your systems updated – in many cases, hackers take advantage of outdated systems to infiltrate the network. Therefore, frequent updates of the organizational systems and implementing the published security patch will significantly reduce the chances of infection.
  • Use third-party dedicated software to deal with the threat – many programs aimed at addressing specific ransomware threats are constantly being released. One is Windows AppLocker, which is included in the OS and assists in dealing with malware. We recommend contacting the organizational security vendor and considering the offered solutions.
  • Implement technical indicator and YARA rules in the company organizations. We provide our clients with intelligence items accompanied by technical indicators. Additionally, a dedicated repository that includes ransomware indicators was launched.

    3
    A closed forum member looks to blackmail companies using ransomware

    What if I am Already Infected?

  • Restore your files – some ransomware tools create a copy of the file, encrypt it and then erase the original file. If the deletion is performed via the OS erase feature, there is a chance to restore the files, since in majority of the cases, the OS does not immediately overwrite the deleted filed.
  • Decryption of the encrypted files – the decryption will be possible if you were infected by one of these three ransomware types: Bitcryptor, CoinVault or Linux.Encoder.1. Therefore, detecting the exact kind of ransomware that attacked the PC is crucial.
  • Back-up files on a separate storage device regularly – the best practice to avoid damage from a ransomware attack is to backup all your important files on a storage disconnected from the organizational network, since some ransomware variants are capable of encrypting files stored on connected devices. For example, researchers recently reported a ransomware that encrypted files stored on the Cloud Sync folder.
  • If ransomware is detected in the organization, immediately disconnect the infected machine from the network. Do not try to remove the malware or to reboot the system before identifying the ransomware. In some cases, performing one of these actions will make the decryption impossible, even after paying the ransom.

ORX-Locker – A Darknet Ransomware That Even Your Grandmother Can Use

Written by Ran L. and Mickael S.

The bar for becoming a cyber-criminal has never been so low. Whether buying off-the-shelf malware or writing your own, with a small investment, anyone can make a profit. Now it seems that the bar has been lowered even further with the creation of a new Darknet site that offers Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), titled ORX-Locker.

Ransomware-as-a-Service enables a user with no knowledge or cash to create his own stubs and use them to infect systems. If the victim decides to pay, the ransom goes to the service provider, who takes a percent of the payment and forwards the rest to the user. For cyber-criminals, this is a win-win situation. The user who cannot afford to buy the ransomware or does not have the requisite knowledge can acquire it for free, and the creator gets his ransomware spread without any effort from his side.

This is not the first time we have seen this kind of service. McAfee previously (May, 2015) reported on Tox. While Tox was the first ransomware-as-a-service, it seems that ORX has taken the idea one step further, with AV evasion methods and complex communication techniques, and apparently also using universities and other platforms as its infrastructure.

In the “August 2015 IBM Security IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Quarterly, 3Q 2015,” published on Monday (August 24, 2015), IBM mentioned TOX while predicting: “This simplicity may spread rapidly to more sophisticated but less common ransomware attack paradigms and lead to off-the-shelf offerings in the cloud.” Just one day later, a post was published on a closed Darknet forum regarding the new ORX-Locker service.

ORX – First Appearance

On August 25, 2015, a user dubbed orxteam published a post regarding the new ransomware service. The message, which was part of his introduction post – a mandatory post every new user has to make to be accepted to the forum – described the new ORX-Locker ransomware as a service platform. In the introduction, the user presented himself as Team ORX, a group that provides private locker software (their name for ransomware) and also ransomware-as-a-service platform.

ORX team introduction post in a closed Darknet hacking forum.
ORX Team introduction post in a closed Darknet hacking forum.

ORX Locker Online Platform

Team ORX has built a Darknet website dedicated to the new public service. To enter the site, new users just need to register. No email or other identification details are required. Upon registration, users have the option to enter a referral username, which will earn them three percent from every payment made to the new user. After logging in, the user can move between five sections:

Home – the welcome screen where you users can see statistics on how much system has been locked by their ransom, how many victims decided to pay, how much they earned and their current balance.

Build EXE – Team ORX has made the process of creating a stub so simple that the only thing a user needs to do is to enter an ID number for his stub (5 digits max) and the ransom price (ORX put a minimum of $75). After that, the user clicks on the Build EXE button and the stub is created and presented in a table with all other stubs previously created by the user.

ORX-Locker Darknet platform, which enables every registered user to build his own ransomware stub.
ORX-Locker Darknet platform, which enables every registered user to build his own ransomware stub.

Stats – This section presents the user with information on systems infected with his stub, including the system OS, how many files have been encrypted, time and date of infection, how much profit has been generated by each system, etc.

Wallet – following a successful infection, the user can withdraw his earnings and transfer them to a Bitcoin address of his choosing.

Support – This section provides general information on the service, including more information on how to build the stub and a mail address (orxsupport@safe-mail[.]net) that users can contact if they require support.

Ransomware

When a user downloads the created stub, he gets a zip file containing the stub, in the form of an “.exe” file. Both the zip and the stub names consist of a random string, 20-characters long. Each file has a different name.

Once executed, the ransomware starts communicating with various IP addresses. The following is a sample from our analysis:

  1. 130[.]75[.]81[.]251 – Leibniz University of Hanover
  2. 130[.]149[.]200[.]12 – Technical University of Berlin
  3. 171[.]25[.]193[.]9 – DFRI (Swedish non-profit and non-party organization working for digital rights)
  4. 199[.]254[.]238[.]52 – Riseup (Riseup provides online communication tools for people and groups working on liberatory social change)

As you can see, some of the addresses are related to universities and others to organizations with various agendas.

Upon activation, the ransomware connects to the official TOR project website and downloads the TOR client. The malware then transmits data over this channel. Using hidden services for communication is a trend that has been adopted by most known ransomware tools in the last year, as was the case of Cryptowall 3.0. In our analysis, the communication was over the standard 9050 port and over 49201.

The final piece would be the encryption of files on the victim’s machine. Unlike other, more “target oriented” ransomware, this particular one locks all files, changing the file ending to .LOCKED and deletes the originals.

When the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted, and a payment instruction file will be created on the desktop.

After the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted
After the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted

In the payment instruction file (.html), the victim receives a unique payment ID and a link to the payment website, located on the onion network (rkcgwcsfwhvuvgli[.]onion). After entering the site using the payment ID, the victim receives another set of instructions in order to complete the payment.

ORX-Locker payment platform which has a dedicated site located on the onion network.
ORX-Locker payment platform, which has a dedicated site located on the onion network.

Finally, although some basic persistence and anti-AV mechanisms are present, the malware still has room to “grow.” We are certain that as its popularity grows, more developments and enhancements will follow.

YARA rule:

rule ORXLocker
{
meta:
author = “SenseCy”
date = “30/08/15”
description = “ORXLocker_yara_rule”

strings:
$string0 = {43 61 6e 27 74 20 63 6f 6d 70 6c 65 74 65 20 53 4f 43 4b 53 34 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 74 6f 20 25 64 2e 25 64 2e 25 64 2e 25 64 3a 25 64 2e 20 28 25 64 29 2c 20 72 65 71 75 65 73 74 20 72 65 6a 65 63 74 65 64 20 62 65 63 61 75 73 65 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 61 6e 64 20 69 64 65 6e 74 64 20 72 65 70 6f 72 74 20 64 69 66 66 65 72 65 6e 74 20 75 73 65 72 2d 69 64 73 2e}
$string1 = {43 61 6e 27 74 20 63 6f 6d 70 6c 65 74 65 20 53 4f 43 4b 53 35 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 74 6f 20 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 64 2e 20 28 25 64 29}
$string2 = {53 4f 43 4b 53 35 3a 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 20 72 65 73 6f 6c 76 69 6e 67 20 64 69 73 61 62 6c 65 64 20 66 6f 72 20 68 6f 73 74 6e 61 6d 65 73 20 6f 66 20 6c 65 6e 67 74 68 20 3e 20 32 35 35 20 5b 61 63 74 75 61 6c 20 6c 65 6e 3d 25 7a 75 5d}
$string3 = {50 72 6f 78 79 20 43 4f 4e 4e 45 43 54 20 66 6f 6c 6c 6f 77 65 64 20 62 79 20 25 7a 64 20 62 79 74 65 73 20 6f 66 20 6f 70 61 71 75 65 20 64 61 74 61 2e 20 44 61 74 61 20 69 67 6e 6f 72 65 64 20 28 6b 6e 6f 77 6e 20 62 75 67 20 23 33 39 29}
$string4 = {3c 61 20 68 72 65 66 3d 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 72 6b 63 67 77 63 73 66 77 68 76 75 76 67 6c 69 2e 74 6f 72 32 77 65 62 2e 6f 72 67 3e 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 72 6b 63 67 77 63 73 66 77 68 76 75 76 67 6c 69 2e 74 6f 72 32 77 65 62 2e 6f 72 67 3c 2f 61 3e 3c 62 72 3e}
$string5 = {43 3a 5c 44 65 76 5c 46 69 6e 61 6c 5c 52 65 6c 65 61 73 65 5c 6d 61 69 6e 2e 70 64 62}
$string6 = {2e 3f 41 56 3f 24 62 61 73 69 63 5f 6f 66 73 74 72 65 61 6d 40 44 55 3f 24 63 68 61 72 5f 74 72 61 69 74 73 40 44 40 73 74 64 40 40 40 73 74 64 40 40}
$string7 = {2e 3f 41 56 3f 24 62 61 73 69 63 5f 69 6f 73 40 5f 57 55 3f 24 63 68 61 72 5f 74 72 61 69 74 73 40 5f 57 40 73 74 64 40 40 40 73 74 64 40 40}
$string8 = “ttp://4rhfxsrzmzilheyj.onion/get.php?a=” wide
$string9 = “\\Payment-Instructions.htm” wide

condition:
all of them
}

Brazilian Trojans Poised to Spread around the World

When we talk about Brazil, we no longer think only Carnival and caipiriña, or the favelas (slums) that came into being as a result of the highly unequal distribution of income. Bearing in mind that Brazil is one of the largest countries in the world, a major new concern has arisen as the Internet and technological devices are being used to find fast ways to earn money.

In 2014, Brazil was listed as the country with the most number of attacked users. Kaspersky identified over 90,000 attacks in Brazil, with Russia in second place.

Brzail_number_of_attacksCybercrime has combined the creativity of Brazilian hackers with new forms of illegal activities, specifically online bank fraud, turning the country into a producer of Trojan malware. The increased variety of Trojans produced in Brazil is becoming a trend. Hackers are spreading their tools via hacking communities, by selling or simply sharing tools, tutorials and tips for using Trojans as a means to intercept information on users and their banks. They use social network platforms, personal blogs or “security information web sites,” IRC channels and the forums on the deep web where “laranjas” (oranges in Portuguese, used to denominate a tool/card trader) do business to sell the malware or the stolen data.

A hacker asks for help in generating Boletos, a payment method consisting with bank tickets, commonly used in Brazil
A hacker asks for help in generating Boletos, a payment method consisting with bank tickets, commonly used in Brazil

While hackers from other countries use malware tools such as Zeus, the uniqueness of the Brazilian hackers is that they develop specific, personalized codes targeting banking frauds. They also find creative ways to use software to access their targets, with the aim of stealing bank accounts. CPL is one of these innovations – a legitimate Windows Control Panel file is being used by cybercriminals to spread banking Trojans targeting Brazilian users.

Cybercriminals send fake emails, using social engineering techniques designed to mislead users. Usually, the email content is a document with a quotation, invoice or receipt, information on a debt or a banking situation, or digital payment instruments used in Brazil, such as Boleto bancário or Electronic tax note, file photographs, videos or similar.

An example for the use of the CPL malware in a phishing email
An example for the use of the CPL malware in a phishing email

The fact that Brazil has the highest percentage of online banking users has also contributed to the development of different personalized attacks. As a result, banking Trojans have become the number one threat in Brazilian cybercrime. As previously demonstrated in the Brazilian malware arena, some code writers spread their viruses around the world. The security sector, in this case the banking sector, must be aware of the possible dangers and increase their efforts to protect their clients.