PARIS LA DÉFENSE–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Powered by the cutting-edge technologies and products of Thales and Verint, the two companies are pleased to present The Cyberthreat Handbook,a report of unprecedented scope designed to provide a classification and basis for further investigation of major groups of cyberattackers, including cybercriminals, cyberterrorists, hacktivist groups and state-sponsored hackers. As part of the strategic partnership to create a comprehensive, state-of-the art Cyber Threat Intelligence technologies, threat intelligence analysts from Thales and Verint have worked together to provide this unique 360° view of the cyberthreat landscape, with detailed descriptions of the activities of about sixty particularly significant groups, including their tactics and techniques, their motives and the sectors targeted from analysis of multiple data sources such as web and threat intelligence.
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2016 has been replete with an unprecedented volume of cyber events of varying impact and future significance. From our perspective, on account of our persistent presence and active participation in discussions Continue reading “SenseCy 2016 Annual CTI Report”
This year, #OpIsrael hacktivists focused on defacing private websites, carrying out DDoS attacks and leaking databases. Hundreds of private Israeli websites were defaced, mostly by Fallaga and AnonGhost members. Various databases containing Israeli email addresses and credit cards were leaked, but the majority were recycled from previous campaigns.
The hacktivists attacks commenced on April 5, 2016, two days before the campaign was launched, with a massive DDoS attack against an Israeli company that provides cloud services. The fact that no one took responsibility for the attack, alongside the massive DDoS power invested, may indicate that threat actors with advanced technical abilities were responsible.
On April 7, 2016, approximately 2,650 Facebook users expressed their desire to participate in the campaign via anti-Israel Facebook event pages. There are several possible reasons for the low number of participants (compared for example to the 5,200 participants in #OpIsrael 2015). One reason might be disappointment in last year’s lack of significant achievements. Another reason could be the devotion of attention to other topics, such as the cyber campaign against the Islamic State (IS), in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels. Moreover, it is possible that anti-Israel hacktivists have abandoned social media networks for other platforms, such as IRC and Telegram.
During the campaign, we detected many indications of the use of common DDoS tools, such as HOIC, and simple DDoS web platforms that do not require any prior technical knowledge in order to operate them. Most of the DDoS attacks were directed against Israeli government and financial websites. Hacktivists claimed they managed to take down two Israeli bank websites. While this could be true, the websites were up and operational again within a short time. In addition, there were no indications of the use of RATs or ransomware against Israeli targets.
As mentioned previously, most of the leaked databases were recycled from previous campaigns. However, we noticed that almost all of the new leaked databases were stolen from the same source – an Israeli company that develop websites. Notably, during the 2014 #OpIsrael campaign, this company website appeared on a list of hacked websites.
There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the leakage of these databases, which raises many questions, since anti-Israel hacktivists typically publish their achievements on social media networks to promote the success of the campaign. Moreover, almost all of these databases were first leaked in the Darknet, but anti-Israel hacktivists do not use this platform at all. In addition, all of the data leakages were allegedly leaked by a hacker dubbed #IndoGhost, but there are no indications to suggest that this entity was involved in the #OpIsrael campaign or any other anti-Israel activity.
Finally, we detected several attempts to organize another anti-Israel campaign for May 7, 2016. As an example, we identified a post calling to hack Israeli government websites on this date. We estimate that these attempts will not succeed in organizing another anti-Israel cyber campaign.
Written and prepared by SenseCy’s Cyber Intelligence analysts.
SenseCy’s 2015 Annual CTI Report spans the main trends and activities monitored by us in the different cyber arenas including the world of Arab hacktivism, the Russian underground, the English-speaking underground, the Darknet and the Iranian underground. In addition, we have listed the major cyber incidents that occurred in 2015, and the most prominent attacks against Israeli organizations.
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2015 was a prolific year for cyber threats, so before elaborating on our main insights from the different arenas covered here at SenseCy, we would like to first summarize three of the main trends we observed in 2015.
Firstly, when reviewing 2015, we recommend paying special attention to the evolving world of ransomware and new applications of this type of malware, such as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), and ransomware targeting cloud services, as opposed to local networks and more.
Secondly, throughout 2015, we witnessed cyber-attacks against high-profile targets attributed to ISIS-affiliated hackers and groups. One such incident was the January 2015 allegedly attack against the YouTube channel and Twitter account of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).
Thirdly, 2015 revealed a continuing interest in the field of critical infrastructure among hackers. Throughout the year, we witnessed multiple incidents of critical infrastructure firms allegedly targeted by hackers, prompting periodic analyses addressing the potential vulnerabilities of critical sectors such as energy, water, and more. Taking into consideration the advanced capabilities and high-level of understanding of such systems required to execute such attacks, many security firms and experts are confident that these attacks are supported by nation-state actors.
The following are several of our insights regarding activities in different cyber arenas this past year:
During 2015, we detected several indications of anti-Israel cybercrime activity on closed platforms frequented by Arabic-speaking hackers. It will be interesting to see if these anti-Israel hacktivists that usually call to deface Israeli websites or carry out DDoS attacks will attempt to incorporate phishing attacks, spamming methods and tools into their arsenals. Notwithstanding, Islamic hacktivism activity continues unabated, but without any significant success.
Trade on Russian Underground Forums
The prominent products currently traded during 2015 on Russian underground forums are ransomware programs and exploits targeting Microsoft Office. With regard to banking Trojans, we did not notice any major developments or the appearance of new Trojans for sale. The PoS malware field has not yielded any new threats either, in contrast to the impression given by its intensive media coverage.
Mobile malware for Android devices is on the rise as well, with the majority of tools offered being Trojans, but we have also detected ransomware and loaders.
Prices on the Russian Underground have remained unchanged during the past two years, due to the vigorous competition between sellers on these platforms.
Different kinds of services, such as digital signing for malicious files, injections development for MitM attacks and crypting malware to avoid detection were also extremely popular on Russian forums.
The English-Language Underground
Our analysis of password-protected forums revealed that exploits were the best-selling products of 2015. This comes as no surprise, since exploits are a vital part of almost every attack.
The Darknet made the headlines on multiple occasions this year, mostly owing to databases that were leaked on it and media reports recounting FBI activities against Darknet users. Furthermore, this year saw increased activity by the hacking community on the Darknet, manifested in dedicated markets for the sale of 0-day exploits and the establishment of several new hacking forums.
The Iranian Underground
With regard to Iranian threat actors, 2015 was a highly prolific year, with attack groups making headlines around the world. Delving deeper into the Iranian underground, we uncovered several interesting trends, some more clear than others.
One main development in 2015 was the persistent interest in critical infrastructure, with underground forum members sharing and requesting information related to industrial control systems and other related components. With Iranian actors becoming increasingly drawn to this field, we assess that this trend will remain relevant in 2016 as well.
Another growing phenomenon is the stunted life cycles of Iranian cyber groups, many with a life-span of just several months. This trend makes it difficult to monitor the different entities active in the Iranian cyber arena and their activities. To understand the constant changes in this realm, this short life cycle trend must be taken into consideration and the Iranian cyber arena continuously monitored.
That said, we must not overlook one of the most prominent characteristics of Iranian attack groups – confidentiality. With attacks attributed to Iranian actors becoming more sophisticated and high-profile, we believe that the divide between medium-level practices of malicious activity and alleged state-sponsored activity by attack groups will remain pronounced.
ISIS – Cyber-Jihad
On the other side of the Arab-speaking cyber world, we can find ISIS and its evolving cyber activities. There is disagreement between intelligence firms and cyber experts about the cyber offensive capabilities of the Islamic State. In addition, there is a high motivation among hackers that identify with the group’s fundamentalist agenda to carry out cyber-attacks against Western targets, especially against those countries actively involved in the war against the group in Iraq and Syria.
The answer to this question is Yes and No (or Probably Not).
Recently, we noticed a heated debate among Arabic-speaking hackers regarding rumors about a new njRAT version, dubbed v0.8d. Some doubted the credibility of the report, cautioning that the new version was probably a fake that would infect everyone who tried to use it. They also claimed that the original njRAT programmer, njq8, had stopped updating it.
Notwithstanding, there is a tutorial with a download link that shows the features of the new version. The video was published on several YouTube accounts and some of them linked the new version to an unknown hacker called Naseer2012 (whose name is similar to njq8‘s real name). In addition, this new njRAT version has aroused interest among Portuguese-speaking hackers, raising assumptions that the njRAT v0.8d developer is actually “Ajnabi” (foreign in Arabic).
The allegedly new njRAT version piqued our curiosity, so we downloaded it from the tutorial. First, the GUI of the new version closely resembles njRAT v0.7d. In addition, our technical analysis revealed that it belongs to the njRAT malware family, based on its Imphash (hash based on portable executable imports that are the functions of the specific malware) and its network signature.
However, it does not have any unique capabilities that distinguish it from the old 0.7d version. Its capabilities, according to our technical analysis, are keylogging, remote shell, remote desktop, password recovery, registry manager, file manager, remote webcam, microphone control, download & execute and DDoS. Unlike njRAT v0.7d, this malware does not have any security features, other than change icon. It can be spread by USB.
Notably, the fact that Naseer2012 thanks njq8 suggests it this not an official upgraded version of the njRAT malware developed by the original programmer.
Since the source code of the worm version of the famous njRAT malware (Njw0rm) was leaked in May 2013, many hackers have developed new malware under different names with numerous capabilities, security features and propagation protocols. However, they all have a common behavior pattern, since they are based on the same source code. In addition, our technical analysis of different RAT malware samples that we detected during 2015 revealed that almost a dozen of them belong to the njRAT family.
So we can all relax as there is no new official njRAT version, but rather a new GUI and new technical indicators of another njRAT-based malware sample.
The following is a YARA rule based on our technical analysis:
Any ISIS activities become a hot topic after destructive events organized by the Islamic State (IS) during 2015. The whole world is concerned about ISIS plans and afraid of another bloody attacks.
One of the most discussed topic is the Islamic State offensive capabilities in the cyber space. In 2015 various organizations were hit by a number of cyber-attacks allegedly launched by IS hackers. Nevertheless, some cyber security experts presume that a sophisticated group of Russian hackers stands behind the attacks against a French TV station in April 2015 and the hijacking of the CENTCOM Twitter account in January 2015. Anyway, let’s have a look at the timeline of cyber-attacks that are related to ISIS in 2015. Investigate the Infographic. We will appreciate your opinion regarding ISIS cyber capabilities.
During January 2016 we will publish our annual Cyber Threat Intelligence report, in which you could find fascinating information regarding ISIS cyber activities, recent developments in the Russian underground, technical analysis of self-developed malicious tools that we identified this year, new trends in Darknet platforms, and more.
The short answer to this question is another question – does it really matter? What is more important is their ever-growing desire and motivation to obtain and develop offensive capabilities in cyber-space.
There has been debate among security experts on this matter since the Islamic State (IS) started operating in the cyber domain. On the one hand, some argue that IS hackers have already proven their ability to launch successful cyber-attacks and now they are attempting to carry out meaningful attacks against critical infrastructures (with no success thus far).
On the other hand, an emerging theory suggests that attacks previously associated with IS were actually perpetrated by a sophisticated group of Russian hackers. In other words, the alleged attacks against a French TV station in April 2015, the hijacking of the CENTCOM Twitter account in January 2015 and others were the work of a Russian APT group, and not the IS-affiliated “Cyber Caliphate.”
But again – does it really matter? We can say with a high degree of certainty that IS as a terror organization is trying to develop cyber capabilities. We received a strong indication of this trend in late August 2015, when a US drone strike killed a British IS cyber expert.
Even before that, in early 2014, we had heard of so-called cyber operations conducted by the Al-Qaeda Electronic Army (AQEA, or AQECA – the Al-Qaeda Electronic Cyber Army) against US government websites.
We assess that at the moment IS hacking entities (such as “Cyber Caliphate” or the Islamic Cyber Army – ICA) do not have high technical capabilities. That said, we should not underestimate the Islamic State’s attempts to develop an offensive cyber capability. An analysis of IS publications reveals a clear increase in the motivation of IS-inspired hackers to wage attacks against high-profile Western targets.
A concerning development in this aspect would be indications of the purchasing of attack tools and malware from highly sophisticated cyber criminals. Taking into consideration the clear intentions expressed by IS in relation to executing cyber-attacks against the West, such tools could be directed at critical infrastructures, sensitive organizations, government agencies and more.
Hacking group AnonGhost has published an official video on #OpUSA, its upcoming cyber campaign against the United States. The video, addressed to the U.S. government, does not mention the date of the campaign or the list of targets, but based on the group’s 2013 #OpUSA campaign, it appears that it is set to take place on May 7. The official video’s YouTube page mentions prominent AnonGhost members Mauritania Attacker, An0nx0xtn, DarkCoder, Donnazmi, and Hussein Haxor, all of whom promote the group’s agenda in social networks.
On May 7, 2013, AnonGhost, along with other groups such as the Tunisian Hackers, threatened to hack American government and financial websites. While they were highly motivated, they failed to achieve much other than to deface several websites and leak emails and personal information. A possible reason for their limited success is that several days before the campaign, hackers speculated on social media that #OpUSA was actually a trap set by the federal government in order to expose and arrest the participants.
One of the groups that participated in 2013, N4m3le55 Cr3w, published a long list of recommended DDoS tools at that time, most of which are common hacking tools that are likely to be used in the current campaign as well.
TorsHammer, a Python-based DDoS tool created by the group called An0nSec.
SYN Flood DOS, a DDoS tool that operates with NMAP and conducts a SYN Flood attack.