The IoT Threat – Infographic

2016 made IoT one of the hottest topics across the cyber security industry as Internet-connected devices became a major tool for DDoS attacks. Researchers expect that the role of IoT will only grow in the coming years. Although very recent, the first signs for this new threat vector were visible over the past two years, with malicious actors engaging in IoT exploitability and attacks utilizing these devices. In fact, IoT botnets are not new. In 2015, Continue reading “The IoT Threat – Infographic”

SenseCy’s Predictions for the Cyber Global Arena in 2017 – Infographic

2016 witnessed an unprecedented volume of cyber events of varying impact and future significance. Following a detailed analysis of those events deemed to have the most strategic future ramifications, we have identified a number of major trends and concerning developments expected to gain momentum in 2017. Check out our new Continue reading “SenseCy’s Predictions for the Cyber Global Arena in 2017 – Infographic”

Exploit Kits Out, Loaders and Macros Back in

During 2016, we witnessed the collapse of three major exploit kits that were previously used for massive malware delivery: Nuclear (first), Angler and then Neutrino (later). Along with other more private EKs (such as Magnitude), they caused major damage in previous years and served as infection vectors for many malicious malware-distributing campaigns. Continue reading “Exploit Kits Out, Loaders and Macros Back in”

The Shade (Troldesh) Ransomware: One More Soldier in the Army of Encryption Miscreants

Written by Mickael S. and Tanya K.

Last week, SenseCy analysts happened upon a new sample of Shade ransomware, also known as Troldesh, which uses a no_more_ransom extension for encrypted files. This ransomware is far from famous, lacking the glorious Continue reading “The Shade (Troldesh) Ransomware: One More Soldier in the Army of Encryption Miscreants”

Jihadi Cybercrime (Increasing Interest in Spam and Phishing Methods on Closed Islamic State Platforms)

While monitoring closed platforms that propagate an Islamic State agenda, we detected an initial interest in hacking lessons, focusing on spam and phishing methods. Many discussions in the technical sections of closed platforms affiliated with the Islamic State deal with the implementation of Continue reading “Jihadi Cybercrime (Increasing Interest in Spam and Phishing Methods on Closed Islamic State Platforms)”

Anna-senpai – Analysis of the Threat Actor behind the Leak of Mirai

The Mirai IoT Botnet has made a lot of headlines in recent weeks. While the botnet itself was analyzed and discussed by a number of security researchers and companies, none addressed the threat actor behind the recent attacks and the leak of Mirai source code. Such an analysis can provide useful insights into Continue reading “Anna-senpai – Analysis of the Threat Actor behind the Leak of Mirai”

Cerber Ransomware JavaScript Loader Goes Undetected

We have been closely monitoring Cerber ransomware since it first emerged on a Russian password-protected forum, offered as-a-service for members only.

At present, Cerber ransomware constitutes a sophisticated malware threat to organizations. (it was responsible for more than 25% of the total number of ransomware infections recorded worldwide in June 2016, according to Microsoft). Files encrypted by Cerber are currently non-decryptable.

On August 23, 2016, a member of the same closed forum where Cerber ransomware is traded posted a detailed analysis of the loader that the malware uses to install itself. According to his post, he did this after hearing that the loader is very useful and capable of installing any malware without detection. His conclusion was that the loader does not employ any extraordinary methods to install the ransomware, but its tremendous advantage of being fully undetectable by AV programs is due to the usage of several rare code functions that are difficult to emulate.

First, he posted the full obfuscated code of the loader, explaining parts of it:

  • Replacement of the Eval function, i.e. it receives a parameter that contains JavaScript code and executes it. Usually, AV programs emulate this function. Replacing the Eval function blocks this emulation.
  • Another part of the code creates a Desktop shortcut, probably also as an anti-emulator measure (the post writer comments that in his opinion AV would quickly detect it).
  • The next part of the code is obfuscated – a HEX code which is divided and deobfuscated using XOR.After deobfuscation, we can see that the code contains anti-emulation.
  • Then a random string is created and a path from %TEMP% environment obtained for it.
  • The next stage involves downloading the malicious file from an URL address and saving it in the system.
  • A parameter is added to the header to block AV bots and researchers: setRequestHeader(‘cerber’,’true’)
  • If the malicious payload was downloaded properly, it is executed.
  • Finally, the Eval alternative is launched.

Summarizing the analysis, the post author concludes that the advantages of the loader are a good implementation of the payload download and execution and errors control. The disadvantages he mentions are weak implementation of obfuscation and anti-emulation, and low level of usability functionality. He also attached an AV scanner report from August 23, showing a detection rate of 15/40.

Several days later, on August 27, 2016, the same forum member posted that he had analyzed the latest version of the loader and was surprised by the fact it is totally undetectable by AV programs. Moreover, this version is capable of installing payloads from several alternative URL addresses and it uses improved debugging. This version does not use anti-emulation at all, but employs a unique method that totally blocks the AV syntax emulation. 

Below is a description of the main techniques used by the loader to remain undetected:

  • Replacement of the Eval function (even though it is a simple technique, it is used extensively by JS packers and therefore cannot be detected by AV as malicious).
  • The part of the code that avoids emulation is an array that contains random data, with the first element being the important one. The functions Math.floor and Math.random always output only the first element in the array and AV cannot properly emulate them. Full undetectability is achieved by using these two functions.

The emulator will always output one single value and will never reach the part of the array when the right value is located. As a result, the emulator cannot perform the calculations, a critical error occurs and the AV programs are unable to identify the loader as a malicious file.

1
The message that analyzes what code feature allows the malware to avoid AV detection

The post author attached an AV scanner report showing a 0/35 detection rate (as of August 27, 2016).

2
The scan showing that the loader is not detected by AV engines

SenseCy Investigates The English-Language Underground

In 2015 we saw an active underground trading of exploits, botnets and spam tools. The number of Ransomware sales were much lower than it was expected by cyber security experts. Investigate the key trends in hacking tools commerce observed on the English-language underground in 2015 from our short Infographic.

Please contact us to receive your complimentary 2015 SenseCy Annual Cyber Threat Intelligence Report. https://www.sensecy.com/contact

English-language underground_2015

SenseCy 2015 Annual Cyber Threat Intelligence Report

Written and prepared by SenseCy’s Cyber Intelligence analysts.

SenseCy’s 2015 Annual CTI Report spans the main trends and activities monitored by us in the different cyber arenas including the world of Arab hacktivism, the Russian underground, the English-speaking underground, the Darknet and the Iranian underground. In addition, we have listed the major cyber incidents that occurred in 2015, and the most prominent attacks against Israeli organizations.

The following is an excerpt from the report. To receive a copy, please send a request to: info@sensecy.com

Executive Summary

2015 was a prolific year for cyber threats, so before elaborating on our main insights from the different arenas covered here at SenseCy, we would like to first summarize three of the main trends we observed in 2015.

Firstly, when reviewing 2015, we recommend paying special attention to the evolving world of ransomware and new applications of this type of malware, such as Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), and ransomware targeting cloud services, as opposed to local networks and more.

Secondly, throughout 2015, we witnessed cyber-attacks against high-profile targets attributed to ISIS-affiliated hackers and groups. One such incident was the January 2015 allegedly attack against the YouTube channel and Twitter account of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

Thirdly, 2015 revealed a continuing interest in the field of critical infrastructure among hackers. Throughout the year, we witnessed multiple incidents of critical infrastructure firms allegedly targeted by hackers, prompting periodic analyses addressing the potential vulnerabilities of critical sectors such as energy, water, and more. Taking into consideration the advanced capabilities and high-level of understanding of such systems required to execute such attacks, many security firms and experts are confident that these attacks are supported by nation-state actors.

Insights

The following are several of our insights regarding activities in different cyber arenas this past year:

Islamic Hacktivism

During 2015, we detected several indications of anti-Israel cybercrime activity on closed platforms frequented by Arabic-speaking hackers. It will be interesting to see if these anti-Israel hacktivists that usually call to deface Israeli websites or carry out DDoS attacks will attempt to incorporate phishing attacks, spamming methods and tools into their arsenals. Notwithstanding, Islamic hacktivism activity continues unabated, but without any significant success.

Trade on Russian Underground Forums

The prominent products currently traded during 2015 on Russian underground forums are ransomware programs and exploits targeting Microsoft Office. With regard to banking Trojans, we did not notice any major developments or the appearance of new Trojans for sale. The PoS malware field has not yielded any new threats either, in contrast to the impression given by its intensive media coverage.

Mobile malware for Android devices is on the rise as well, with the majority of tools offered being Trojans, but we have also detected ransomware and loaders.

Prices on the Russian Underground have remained unchanged during the past two years, due to the vigorous competition between sellers on these platforms.

Different kinds of services, such as digital signing for malicious files, injections development for MitM attacks and crypting malware to avoid detection were also extremely popular on Russian forums.

Exploits and exploit kits on the Russian underground
Exploits and exploit kits on the Russian underground

The English-Language Underground

Our analysis of password-protected forums revealed that exploits were the best-selling products of 2015. This comes as no surprise, since exploits are a vital part of almost every attack.

The Darknet made the headlines on multiple occasions this year, mostly owing to databases that were leaked on it and media reports recounting FBI activities against Darknet users. Furthermore, this year saw increased activity by the hacking community on the Darknet, manifested in dedicated markets for the sale of 0-day exploits and the establishment of several new hacking forums.

Sales of hacking tools in the English-language underground
Sales of hacking tools in the English-language underground

The Iranian Underground

With regard to Iranian threat actors, 2015 was a highly prolific year, with attack groups making headlines around the world. Delving deeper into the Iranian underground, we uncovered several interesting trends, some more clear than others.

One main development in 2015 was the persistent interest in critical infrastructure, with underground forum members sharing and requesting information related to industrial control systems and other related components. With Iranian actors becoming increasingly drawn to this field, we assess that this trend will remain relevant in 2016 as well.

Another growing phenomenon is the stunted life cycles of Iranian cyber groups, many with a life-span of just several months. This trend makes it difficult to monitor the different entities active in the Iranian cyber arena and their activities. To understand the constant changes in this realm, this short life cycle trend must be taken into consideration and the Iranian cyber arena continuously monitored.

That said, we must not overlook one of the most prominent characteristics of Iranian attack groups – confidentiality. With attacks attributed to Iranian actors becoming more sophisticated and high-profile, we believe that the divide between medium-level practices of malicious activity and alleged state-sponsored activity by attack groups will remain pronounced.

Screenshot from the IDC-Team forum showing, among other things, the list of “Hottest Threads” and “Most Viewed Threads” on the forum
Screenshot from the IDC-Team forum showing, among other things, the list of “Hottest Threads” and “Most Viewed Threads” on the forum

ISIS – Cyber-Jihad

On the other side of the Arab-speaking cyber world, we can find ISIS and its evolving cyber activities. There is disagreement between intelligence firms and cyber experts about the cyber offensive capabilities of the Islamic State. In addition, there is a high motivation among hackers that identify with the group’s fundamentalist agenda to carry out cyber-attacks against Western targets, especially against those countries actively involved in the war against the group in Iraq and Syria.