The Healthcare Sector is Targeted by Cybercriminals More than Ever

The healthcare sector has recently become a desirable target for cyber crooks. According to Symantec ISTR report statistics, healthcare was the most breached sub-sector in 2015, comprising almost 40% of all the attacks. Hospital security systems are generally less secure than those of financial organizations, as monetary theft has always been perceived as the greatest threat for organizations, and dangers to other sectors were usually underestimated. Moreover, awareness of cyber-attacks against hospitals and medical centers is much lower than it is to financial cybercrime, and as a result, the employees are less well-trained on how to avoid falling victim to a cyber-attack.

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Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached by Number of Incidents According to Symantec ISTR report

Only lately, this concept has started to be challenged, revealing the potential damage that can be caused by the theft and leakage of patient data. However, the ‘bad guys’ remain one step ahead and during the last few months, we have witnessed a spate of attacks targeting the healthcare industry: ransomware attacks encrypting essential data and demanding payment of a ransom, numerous data leakages revealing confidential patient data, unauthorized access to medical networks and even the hacking of medical devices, such as pumps and X-ray equipment.

Moreover, the healthcare sector is being targeted by hackers not only directly, but also via third-party companies in the supply chain, such as equipment and drug suppliers. These companies usually store some confidential data that originates in the hospitals’ databases and may even have access to the hospital IT systems, but they are far less secure than the hospitals themselves. Thus, they serve as a preferable infiltration point for malicious actors pursuing the theft of medical data and attempting to infiltrate the hospitals’ networks.

The consequences of attacks on the healthcare industry may be extensive, including the impairment of the medical center functioning, which may result in danger to human lives in the worst case scenario. In other cases, personal data will be stolen and sold on underground markets. Cybercriminals will take advantages of these personal details for identity theft or for future cyber-attacks combining social engineering based on the stolen details.

While monitoring closed Deep-Web and Darknet sources, SenseCy analysts recently noticed a growing interest toward the healthcare sector among cyber criminals. Databases of medical institutions are traded on illicit marketplaces and closed forums, along with access to their servers. In the last few months alone, we came across several occurrences indicating extensive trade of medical records and access to servers where this data is stored.

The first case, in May 2016, was the sale of RDP access for a large clinic group with several branches in the central U.S., which was offered for sale on a Darknet closed forum. For a payment of $50,000 Bitcoins, the buyer would receive access to the compromised workstation, with access to 3 GB of data stored on four hard disks. Additionally, the workstation allows access to an aggregate electronical system (EHR) for managing medical records, where data regarding patients, suppliers, payments and more can be exploited.

Although the seller did not mention the origin of the credentials he was selling, he claimed that local administrator privileges could be received on the compromised system. He also specified that 45 users from the medical personnel were logged into the system from the workstation he hacked.

The relatively high price for this offer indicates the high demand for medical information. With RDP access, the potential attackers can perform any action on the compromised workstation: install malware, encrypt the files or erase them, infect other machines in the network and access any data stored in the network. The consequences can be tremendous.

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An excerpt of the sale thread posted on a Darknet forum

 

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Screenshot allegedly taken on the hacked workstation

Just a few weeks later, in June 2016, our analysts detected another cyber-accident related to healthcare. This time, three databases allegedly stolen via an RDP access to a medical organization were offered for sale for more than $500,000 on a dedicated Darknet marketplace. In one of his posts, the seller claimed that one of the databases belongs to a large American health insurer.

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One of the sales posts on a Darknet marketplace
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Screenshot posted by the seller as a proof of hacking into a medical organization

Before long, we again discovered evidence of hacking into a medical-related organization, this time by Russian-speaking hackers. On one of the forums we monitor, a member tried to sell an SSH access to the server of an American company supplying equipment to 130 medical center in the U.S. He uploaded screenshots proving that he accessed the server where personal data of patients is stored.

The conclusions following these findings are concerning. An extensive trade in medical information and compromised workstations and servers is a common sight on underground illegal markets. This business generates hundreds of thousands, if not millions of dollars annually, ensuring its continuation as long as there are such high profits to those involved. Since the ramifications can be grave, the healthcare sector must take all necessary measures to protect their systems and data:

  1. Implement a strong password policy, because many hacks are a result of brute-force attack. Strong passwords and two-factor authentications to log into organizational systems should be the number one rule for medical organizations.
  2. Deploy suitable security systems.
  3. Instruct the employees to follow cyber security rules – choosing strong and unique passwords, spotting phishing email messages, avoiding clicking on links and downloading files from unknown sources, etc. Consider periodic training for employees on these issues to maintain high awareness and compliance with the rules.
  4. Use Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) – to keep up with the times regarding the current most prominent threats to your organization and industry.
  5. Keep all software updated.

ORX-Locker – A Darknet Ransomware That Even Your Grandmother Can Use

Written by Ran L. and Mickael S.

The bar for becoming a cyber-criminal has never been so low. Whether buying off-the-shelf malware or writing your own, with a small investment, anyone can make a profit. Now it seems that the bar has been lowered even further with the creation of a new Darknet site that offers Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), titled ORX-Locker.

Ransomware-as-a-Service enables a user with no knowledge or cash to create his own stubs and use them to infect systems. If the victim decides to pay, the ransom goes to the service provider, who takes a percent of the payment and forwards the rest to the user. For cyber-criminals, this is a win-win situation. The user who cannot afford to buy the ransomware or does not have the requisite knowledge can acquire it for free, and the creator gets his ransomware spread without any effort from his side.

This is not the first time we have seen this kind of service. McAfee previously (May, 2015) reported on Tox. While Tox was the first ransomware-as-a-service, it seems that ORX has taken the idea one step further, with AV evasion methods and complex communication techniques, and apparently also using universities and other platforms as its infrastructure.

In the “August 2015 IBM Security IBM X-Force Threat Intelligence Quarterly, 3Q 2015,” published on Monday (August 24, 2015), IBM mentioned TOX while predicting: “This simplicity may spread rapidly to more sophisticated but less common ransomware attack paradigms and lead to off-the-shelf offerings in the cloud.” Just one day later, a post was published on a closed Darknet forum regarding the new ORX-Locker service.

ORX – First Appearance

On August 25, 2015, a user dubbed orxteam published a post regarding the new ransomware service. The message, which was part of his introduction post – a mandatory post every new user has to make to be accepted to the forum – described the new ORX-Locker ransomware as a service platform. In the introduction, the user presented himself as Team ORX, a group that provides private locker software (their name for ransomware) and also ransomware-as-a-service platform.

ORX team introduction post in a closed Darknet hacking forum.
ORX Team introduction post in a closed Darknet hacking forum.

ORX Locker Online Platform

Team ORX has built a Darknet website dedicated to the new public service. To enter the site, new users just need to register. No email or other identification details are required. Upon registration, users have the option to enter a referral username, which will earn them three percent from every payment made to the new user. After logging in, the user can move between five sections:

Home – the welcome screen where you users can see statistics on how much system has been locked by their ransom, how many victims decided to pay, how much they earned and their current balance.

Build EXE – Team ORX has made the process of creating a stub so simple that the only thing a user needs to do is to enter an ID number for his stub (5 digits max) and the ransom price (ORX put a minimum of $75). After that, the user clicks on the Build EXE button and the stub is created and presented in a table with all other stubs previously created by the user.

ORX-Locker Darknet platform, which enables every registered user to build his own ransomware stub.
ORX-Locker Darknet platform, which enables every registered user to build his own ransomware stub.

Stats – This section presents the user with information on systems infected with his stub, including the system OS, how many files have been encrypted, time and date of infection, how much profit has been generated by each system, etc.

Wallet – following a successful infection, the user can withdraw his earnings and transfer them to a Bitcoin address of his choosing.

Support – This section provides general information on the service, including more information on how to build the stub and a mail address (orxsupport@safe-mail[.]net) that users can contact if they require support.

Ransomware

When a user downloads the created stub, he gets a zip file containing the stub, in the form of an “.exe” file. Both the zip and the stub names consist of a random string, 20-characters long. Each file has a different name.

Once executed, the ransomware starts communicating with various IP addresses. The following is a sample from our analysis:

  1. 130[.]75[.]81[.]251 – Leibniz University of Hanover
  2. 130[.]149[.]200[.]12 – Technical University of Berlin
  3. 171[.]25[.]193[.]9 – DFRI (Swedish non-profit and non-party organization working for digital rights)
  4. 199[.]254[.]238[.]52 – Riseup (Riseup provides online communication tools for people and groups working on liberatory social change)

As you can see, some of the addresses are related to universities and others to organizations with various agendas.

Upon activation, the ransomware connects to the official TOR project website and downloads the TOR client. The malware then transmits data over this channel. Using hidden services for communication is a trend that has been adopted by most known ransomware tools in the last year, as was the case of Cryptowall 3.0. In our analysis, the communication was over the standard 9050 port and over 49201.

The final piece would be the encryption of files on the victim’s machine. Unlike other, more “target oriented” ransomware, this particular one locks all files, changing the file ending to .LOCKED and deletes the originals.

When the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted, and a payment instruction file will be created on the desktop.

After the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted
After the ransomware finishes encrypting the files, a message will popup announcing that all the files were encrypted

In the payment instruction file (.html), the victim receives a unique payment ID and a link to the payment website, located on the onion network (rkcgwcsfwhvuvgli[.]onion). After entering the site using the payment ID, the victim receives another set of instructions in order to complete the payment.

ORX-Locker payment platform which has a dedicated site located on the onion network.
ORX-Locker payment platform, which has a dedicated site located on the onion network.

Finally, although some basic persistence and anti-AV mechanisms are present, the malware still has room to “grow.” We are certain that as its popularity grows, more developments and enhancements will follow.

YARA rule:

rule ORXLocker
{
meta:
author = “SenseCy”
date = “30/08/15”
description = “ORXLocker_yara_rule”

strings:
$string0 = {43 61 6e 27 74 20 63 6f 6d 70 6c 65 74 65 20 53 4f 43 4b 53 34 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 74 6f 20 25 64 2e 25 64 2e 25 64 2e 25 64 3a 25 64 2e 20 28 25 64 29 2c 20 72 65 71 75 65 73 74 20 72 65 6a 65 63 74 65 64 20 62 65 63 61 75 73 65 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 69 65 6e 74 20 70 72 6f 67 72 61 6d 20 61 6e 64 20 69 64 65 6e 74 64 20 72 65 70 6f 72 74 20 64 69 66 66 65 72 65 6e 74 20 75 73 65 72 2d 69 64 73 2e}
$string1 = {43 61 6e 27 74 20 63 6f 6d 70 6c 65 74 65 20 53 4f 43 4b 53 35 20 63 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 20 74 6f 20 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 30 32 78 25 30 32 78 3a 25 64 2e 20 28 25 64 29}
$string2 = {53 4f 43 4b 53 35 3a 20 73 65 72 76 65 72 20 72 65 73 6f 6c 76 69 6e 67 20 64 69 73 61 62 6c 65 64 20 66 6f 72 20 68 6f 73 74 6e 61 6d 65 73 20 6f 66 20 6c 65 6e 67 74 68 20 3e 20 32 35 35 20 5b 61 63 74 75 61 6c 20 6c 65 6e 3d 25 7a 75 5d}
$string3 = {50 72 6f 78 79 20 43 4f 4e 4e 45 43 54 20 66 6f 6c 6c 6f 77 65 64 20 62 79 20 25 7a 64 20 62 79 74 65 73 20 6f 66 20 6f 70 61 71 75 65 20 64 61 74 61 2e 20 44 61 74 61 20 69 67 6e 6f 72 65 64 20 28 6b 6e 6f 77 6e 20 62 75 67 20 23 33 39 29}
$string4 = {3c 61 20 68 72 65 66 3d 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 72 6b 63 67 77 63 73 66 77 68 76 75 76 67 6c 69 2e 74 6f 72 32 77 65 62 2e 6f 72 67 3e 68 74 74 70 73 3a 2f 2f 72 6b 63 67 77 63 73 66 77 68 76 75 76 67 6c 69 2e 74 6f 72 32 77 65 62 2e 6f 72 67 3c 2f 61 3e 3c 62 72 3e}
$string5 = {43 3a 5c 44 65 76 5c 46 69 6e 61 6c 5c 52 65 6c 65 61 73 65 5c 6d 61 69 6e 2e 70 64 62}
$string6 = {2e 3f 41 56 3f 24 62 61 73 69 63 5f 6f 66 73 74 72 65 61 6d 40 44 55 3f 24 63 68 61 72 5f 74 72 61 69 74 73 40 44 40 73 74 64 40 40 40 73 74 64 40 40}
$string7 = {2e 3f 41 56 3f 24 62 61 73 69 63 5f 69 6f 73 40 5f 57 55 3f 24 63 68 61 72 5f 74 72 61 69 74 73 40 5f 57 40 73 74 64 40 40 40 73 74 64 40 40}
$string8 = “ttp://4rhfxsrzmzilheyj.onion/get.php?a=” wide
$string9 = “\\Payment-Instructions.htm” wide

condition:
all of them
}

The Latest Trends in the Russian Underground – H1 2015 Summary

It is summer in Russia, and the time of the year when people head to the seaside on vacation for a couple of weeks’ break. The decline in activity can be clearly seen on the Russian-speaking forums and marketplaces dealing with cybercrime. Apparently, cybercriminals also take a rest from their online activities, just as they would from a regular full-time job. For us, it is the best time to perform a deep analysis of the main trends in the Russian underground boards during the first half of 2015. When preparing the insights from this analysis, our goal was to identify the main scope of interest on closed, Russian-speaking forums these days, as well as to pinpoint the shifts that have occurred in the last six months.

In order to draw conclusions, we analyzed the threads from the last six months from the four leading Russian forums. These forums mainly serve as a marketplace for attack tools and platforms, in addition to being a source of information and consultation for the forum members. Hereinafter, we tried to summarize the main topics of conversation on Russian marketplaces dedicated to cybercrime during the past six months:

Exploit Kits: In recent months, we have witnessed numerous attacks involving EK as the intrusion vector, including Angler, Neutrino, Nuclear, Magnitude and RIG. These EKs are constantly updated with new exploits.

While some EKs are offered for sale on trading boards, others are available exclusively to selected buyers via private sales, using the Jabber instant messaging system for example. For one case in point, RIG EK 3.0 is offered for a monthly rental fee of $700 on a closed Russian forum (this is considered an extremely low price). In comparison, Angler EK, AKA XXX is not advertised at all among Russian forum members on any of the closed forums.

RIG EK Statistics – screenshots published by the developer of the EK
RIG EK Statistics – screenshots published by the developer of the EK

Banking Trojans: During the last few months, we did not spot any new banking Trojans for sale on the Russian underground. The majority of recent attacks against the financial industry clients were perpetrated using DYRE or Dridex banking Trojans. Even though there is evidence that both were developed by Russian coders and are distributed among Russian-speaking criminals, we did not witness any commercial trading of these Trojans.

The two Trojans currently selling on Russian forums are Kronos, whose sales started back in the middle of 2014, and the new version of Tinba, which is based on source code leaked in the 2014 version.

Tinba banking Trojan offered for rent
Tinba banking Trojan offered for rent

Ransomware: Despite the fact that new campaigns distributing ransomware are uncovered on a regular basis, culminating in an FBI alert at the beginning of 2015, we did not see an elevated interest in this kind of malware on the Russian forums. The sales of CTB-Locker were ceased, at least publicly, probably because of the extensive media coverage. None of the ransomware tools that are widely used in the wild (TorrentLocker, Tesla Crypt, Cryptowall), are offered for sale on Russian marketplaces. The only two new ransomware tools offered during H1 2015 were GM Cryptolocker for Android-based devices and Azazel locker, for just $200. Both are relatively new and there has been no comprehensive feedback from buyers as yet.

The interface of GM Cryptolocker – ransomware for mobile platforms
The interface of GM Cryptolocker – ransomware for mobile platforms

RAT malware based on legitimate software – a clear new trend on the Russian underground is the development of malicious tools based on the source code of legitimate software for remote access (such as TeamViewer, AmmyAdmin, etc.). These tools are disguised as an update for the software or as a setup file. Additional tools traded on the forums exploit services and programs for remote control, such as RDS (Remote Desktop Services, RMS (Remote Manipulator System) and RDP (Remote Desktop Protocol).

To date, we have identified five different malicious tools of this kind for sale during the last six months. According to the sellers’ description, they are capable of bypassing defense mechanisms installed on the machine and gaining full access to it.

Screenshot from a video uploaded by the seller of TVSpy, a RAT based on TeamViewer software. The video presents the malware in action.
Screenshot from a video uploaded by the seller of TVSpy, a RAT based on TeamViewer software. The video presents the malware in action.

Loaders and Droppers – In recent months, we have identified a rise in this type of malware for sale on Russian underground forums. Generally, they it is spread via spam emails, and once installed on the system, serves as a tunnel for later installations of malicious programs. In this manner, defense mechanisms can be bypassed. One instance involving this malware was the infamous Andromeda, sold since 2011 to date for only $500. Andromeda was employed by the Carbanak group against financial targets. Aside from Andromeda, we also identified six new loaders and droppers offered for sale during the past six months.

Digital Certificates Trade – This phenomenon started as a sporadic sales thread, appearing occasionally on several forums during the last year. As demand expanded, trade in digital certificates evolved into a successful sub-category on Russian underground marketplaces. Recently, a dedicated online shop for trade in digital certificates was launched. The average price for one certificate is about 1.4 BTC.

The vigorous trade in these certificates demonstrates that they are quite useful for the purchasers, who use them to sign the malicious code they distribute and evade detection.

For obvious reasons, the sellers do not disclose the origin of the certificates, but claim they are authentic and were issued by a Certificate Authority (CA).

An online shop for digital certificates trade
An online shop for digital certificates trade

Shell Profiles on the Russian Underground

Russian underground cyber-markets are known venues for purchasing high-quality hacking tools and services. Many such tools, popular worldwide, make their first appearances on closed Russian forums. There are two main types of sellers on these platforms: well-known members with seniority and strong reputations, who have already sold tools and received positive buyer feedback, and an emerging “shell profile” type of user. According to our recent analysis, such users typically register to a forum a few days before posting an advertisement for the tool. These new users often enlist the aid of forum administrators and more senior members, by providing them with a copy of the tool for their review, and thus gain the trust of potential buyers.

CTB-Locker

For example, CTB-Locker, a malware program, was first advertised on a Russian underground forum on June 10, 2014 by a user called Tapkin. This ransomware scans the computer for data files, encrypts them with a unique algorithm, and demands a ransom to release them. Tapkin registered on this forum on June 2, 2014, several days before posting the advertisement, and posted a total of five messages to the forum, all on the subject of CTB-Locker. Around this time, a user by the same name posted identical information on other forums.

Tapkin registered to another Russian underground forum on June 13, 2014, and three days later, he advertised the tool on the forum. This was the first and only thread that Tapkin started on this platform, and all of his posts were about this topic.

Tapkin stopped selling CTB-Locker on June 27, but on November 19, 2014, he posted another advertisement, this time for “serious” clients only. Tapkin last advertised the ransomware on a carding forum on December 8, 2014, after registering to this forum the same day.

Thus, in three cases, Tapkin registered to a forum a few days before posting an advertisement for the tool and did not participate in any other forum discussions. As a newly created profile, Tapkin lacked seniority and therefore had low credibility. However, our impression is that this user demonstrates knowledge regarding the tool, its capabilities and can answer questions regarding the technical component of the tool fluently. An analysis of Tapkin’s posts indicates that behind the shell profile is not one person, but rather a group of people who developed the tool together.

Forum comments indicating the presence of a team behind the username Tapkin
Forum comments indicating the presence of a team behind the username Tapkin

This username appears to have been created for the sole purpose of selling the ransomware, which was only advertised on Russian-speaking platforms. On May 19, 2015, a well-known forum user posted a message stating that his computer had been infected by CTB-Locker and asking for Tapkin. However, Tapkin had by then already disappeared.

Forum member post searching for Tapkin in correlation with CTB-Locker
Forum member post searching for Tapkin in correlation with CTB-Locker

Loki Bot

Another example of malware advertised by a new forum member is the Loki Bot password and coin wallet stealer. Loki Bot, written in C++, can steal passwords from browsers, FTP/SSH applications, email accounts, and poker clients. It has an option to configure C&C IP addresses or domains.

Bot-selling advertisement
Bot-selling advertisement

This bot, which works on Windows versions XP, Vista, 7, 8, and 8.1, is relatively new and is still under development. It was first advertised on a well-known Russian underground forum in early May 2015 by a new user with no reputation. A week later, a user by the same name registered on two other well-known underground forums attempted to boost his credibility by sending the forum administrator a test version of the malware. Similar to the previous example, we assume that a group of people is behind this user as well.

Forum administrator approves a new tool advertised by a “shell profile” user (May 18, 2015)
Forum administrator approves a new tool advertised by a “shell profile” user (May 18, 2015)

We can see that new users are registering on Russian underground forums for one purpose only, to sell a particular malware program, and their entire online presence is focused on this. They register to a forum a few days before posting an advertisement for the tool and do not participate in other forum discussions. Newly created profiles lack seniority and therefore have low credibility ratings. Sometimes such users attempt to improve their credibility by sending the forum administrator a test version of the malware. In some cases we can see that behind the shell profile there is a team, and not an individual. They appear suddenly and disappear just as suddenly after their business is completed.

Intelligence Review of #OpIsrael Cyber Campaign (April 7, 2015)

Starting at the end of last week, hacktivist groups from around the Muslim world tried to attack Israeli websites, particularly those of government institutions, as part of the #OpIsrael cyber campaign. In the past twenty-four hours they stepped up their activity, but we have seen no signs of major attacks. Despite all the publicity prior to the campaign, the hackers’ successes were limited to defacing several hundred private websites and leaking the email addresses of tens of thousands of Israelis, many of them recycled from previous campaigns. Several dozen credit card numbers were also leaked on information-sharing websites, but our examination shows that some were recycled from past leaks.

AnonGhost, which initiated the campaign, was the main actor behind it. However, other groups of hackers, such as Fallaga, MECA (Middle East Cyber Army), Anon.Official.org, and Indonesian and Algerian groups also participated in the attacks. As the campaign progressed, we saw an increasing number of posts and tweets about it (over 3,000), but this is still significantly less than last year, when there were tens of thousands.

As we noted in previous updates, the campaign was conducted primarily on social networks, especially Facebook and Twitter. IRC channels opened for the campaign were barely active, partly because hackers feared spying by “intelligence agents.” On closed forums and Darknet platforms, we saw no activity related to #OpIsrael.

Participants discuss why the campaign is smaller than in 2013
Participants discuss why the campaign is smaller than in 2013

Following is a summary of the main results of the attacks that we have identified so far:

  • Defacing of hundreds of websites. Victims included Meretz (an Israeli political party), various Israeli companies, sub-domains of institutions of higher education, municipalities, Israeli artists, and more.
  • Leaking of tens of thousands of email addresses and personal information of Israelis. A significant portion of the information was recycled from previous campaigns. Databases from third-party websites were also leaked. In addition, two files were leaked and according to the hackers, one had 30,000 email addresses and the other 150,000 records.
  • Publication of details from dozens of credit cards, some of them recycled.

How Hackers Use Social Media Networks to Put Your Organization at Risk

SenseCy’s teams monitor underground and password-protected forums and communities in many languages – Russian, Arabic, Persian, Chinese, Portuguese, English, and more. By gaining access to the Deep Web and Darknet, we identify suspicious activity and new hacker tools and enable our clients to mitigate or eliminate cyber threats.

Hacker communities on social networks continue to evolve. More and more communities are creating Twitter accounts as well as pages and groups in popular social networks such as Facebook and VKontakte (a Russian social network) to share information, tools, and experience.

In the past, hackers came together on social networks to hold operational discussions, share targets, and join forces for DDoS attacks, but less to upload or download hacking tools. Since this is changing, we are now monitoring hacking tools offered for download on Twitter, Facebook, and VKontakte.

Source code published on Twitter
Source code published on Twitter

These hacker communities can be classified into three main categories:

  1. Open public groups and accounts that make common, well-known tools available.

    Open Facebook group of well-known Arab hackers
    Open Facebook group of well-known Arab hackers
  2. Closed, secret groups sharing rare or sector-related tools or programs in a specific language.

    Secret Facebook group from Southeast Asia
    Secret Facebook group from Southeast Asia
  3. Groups sharing or even selling self-developed tools.
    Facebook post in closed Asian hacker group
    Facebook post in closed Asian hacker group

    A prominent example is the self-developed DDoS tool created by hacker group AnonGhost for the #OpIsrael cyber campaign, which is expected to take place on April 7, 2015. This tool uses three flooding methods, TCP, UDP, and HTTP and can operate through a proxy if needed. AnonGhost posted its new tool on its official Facebook page with a link to a tutorial on YouTube, and soon it was widely distributed among hacktivists through social media.

    From AnonGhost's official Facebook Page
    From AnonGhost’s official Facebook Page

    We regularly monitor trends and developments in social networks, since they are becoming the preferred platform for groups of hackers to share and improve attack tools. SenseCy also takes part in these communities, which gives us the edge in preventing attacks in real time. We continue to track new trends and developments to detect cyber threats for our clients.

Spotlight on the Russian Underground Infrastructure

The media is in an uproar at present, reporting on one cyber incident after another. Adobe, Target, Neiman Marcus, Home Depot, JP Morgan – these breaches are just the tip of the iceberg in the cybercrime arena. The Russian underground forums serve as fertile ground for planning cybercrime-motivated breaches worldwide – programming the malicious software, distributing it and sharing knowledge about the most profitable usage, selling the stolen data (such as credentials, etc.). Let us take a deeper look at the internal structure of these forums and the norms of behavior there.

Registration

While many forums have free registration, others require payment (Cybercriminals will never miss an opportunity to profitJ). Some of the forums that ask for registration fees do not contain useful information, and the fee is merely a farce, while for others, the fee is a means to keep poor or noob hackers away from the “big guy discussions.” Some of the forums ask potential candidates to fill out a detailed registration form, clarifying exact capabilities/programming languages they know, while others go one step further and send different hacking tasks to the applicants, demanding proof of their professional level. Many forums have strict policies about filtering out the registrants and very few people are accepted.

Registration page in one of the underground forums
Registration page in one of the underground forums

Communication

When it comes to personal contacts between the seller and buyer, the first choice is the Jabber messenger. Sometimes, one of the sides will request an OTR (Off-the-Record, allowing private conversation using encryption and elimination of all traces of the conversation) protocol for Jabber. Besides, exchanging messages via PM (private message) – the private mailbox on each forum is another popular means of communication. Users wishing to connect via Jabber are sometimes asked to authenticate themselves via private message beforehand – indicating the high level of confidentiality and security concerns.

ICQ is also used, although it is not very common and is perceived as a communication method for less experienced hackers.

Payment

On the underground, you will never see any payment method that would somehow enable identification of the parties in the transaction. Naturally, no credit cards, PayPal accounts or money transactions are accepted – only virtual currencies are used. BTC is rather popular, as well as PM (Perfect Money), LTC (Light Coins), WM (Web Money) and other virtual currencies.

Escrow System

Most of the forums maintain a well-established system of escrow services provided by an official forum member appointed by the administrator. In exchange for a reward, usually a percentage of the transaction value, he mediates between the buyer and the seller, keeping the money until the goods are supplied. He also checks that the product offered matches its description.

Reputation Score

The reputation of the members is one of the pillars of Russian underground forums. Despite the fact that each forum has its own scoring system, all have a common principle: forum members rate each other, based on the threads they post. For instance, by providing useful advice or uploading malware, the author will receive more points. Another reputation booster is the number of posts, as well as seniority on the forum that defines the status of the user: beginner, intermediate, specialist, etc. Certain threads are available only to members with a minimum numbers of posts.

Furthermore, some forums ask for monetary deposits that are displayed next to the user’s name, indicating his reliability. If monetary conflict arises, the sales thread will often be suspended until the issue is clarified. If no solution is found, the seller incurs a “ripper” status, thus losing the chance to sell anything ever again on the forum, unless he changes his nickname.

Member's profile in one of the underground forums
Member’s profile in one of the underground forums

Bad Habits can be Contagious

Written by Hila Marudi and Tanya Koyfman

As the saying goes, bad habits can be contagious… Our experience shows that expertise in illegal fields and sophisticated methods developed to break the law are traits shared among criminals that sometimes find their way across the globe, between places located thousands of miles apart from each other.

Many instances of this phenomenon can be seen in the sphere of physical threats. Weapons and techniques that evolve in one conflict zone and are proven efficient are quickly transmitted to other battlefields and adopted by other terror organizations with totally different agendas to the original one. For instance, our colleagues that trace developments in the physical world recently noticed that explosive “suicide” belts (PBIEDs) that were first deployed in the Caucasus region have found their way into the Syrian conflict, and further afield, into Iraq. These devices are likely intended for use by militants who may choose to initiate the device as a last resort when cornered, thus taking out their adversaries with them.

The cyber battlefield is no exception. Web platforms are used to share information and knowledge, often overcoming language obstacles. Once a hacker manages to code an efficient malware or to reveal a crucial vulnerability, we should not be surprised to find it has soon spread on forums associated with groups that totally differ in agenda and motive. This time we wish to focus on the exchange of capabilities between Russian cyber-criminalists and Arab hackers and hacktivists.

We recently identified discussions on Arab hacker forums about tools developed by their colleagues around the world. For example, on Dev-Point, an Arab forum that deals with programming and penetration testing, one member published a thread about a DDoS tool with a Russian interface named Dirt Jumper. We continued to follow the research into this tool in Arabic and found another message on a hacking forum named v4-team, asking for links to Dirt Jumper.

A thread in Arabic about Dirt Jumper
A thread in Arabic about Dirt Jumper

This malware was already recognized on the Russian underground in 2011, where it was sold for $600 on closed Russian forums. Later, its files were leaked on one of these forums, and today it can be downloaded at no charge. We can only guess at how it “travelled” from a closed Russian forum to an Arabic one, but obviously it took a while.

Post about Dirt Jumper on a Russian underground forum
Post about Dirt Jumper on a Russian underground forum

This exchange of abilities has also been witnessed in the opposite direction. The LostDoor RAT is a popular malware found on Russian forums. Links for downloading versions of the malware are periodically posted on several platforms and discussions about its abilities are held. A deeper investigation of this malware revealed its origins to be Tunisian, owing to the fact that it is displayed on different platforms as the first Tunisian RAT tool.

LostDoor is a product by a company named Hackers®Insides Inc. and its developer is a Tunisian computer specialist nicknamed Unique Oussamio. He often uploads links to new versions of his tool via Twitter, Facebook and a dedicated blog.

Apparently, Oussamio has ties to hacktivism, as he uploaded pictures of himself wearing an Anonymous mask. This may indicate a trend, when malware developed by hacktivists spreads into the cyber-crime world.

LostDoor and its Tunisian developer
LostDoor and its Tunisian developer

To conclude, in the hacker world it does not matter where the malware originates. Northern Africa or Eastern Europe – the only thing that matters is its efficiency. If it can cause enough damage, it will find a way to reach the “right hands” (and shortly afterwards your computer).

SenseCy is coming to town! Come meet us at the RSA USA 2014 conference, February 24-28, in San Francisco. 

Hackers Use Cyber Security Bloggers for PR

Written by Tanya Koyfman

As in any illegal activity, those who break the law are much more familiar with those that try to enforce it than vice versa. The Russian underground is no exception, and members of different forums know much more about security sources and researchers that the latter know about them. Links to a wide variety of sites and blogs dealing with cyber security issues are frequently posted on forum discussions – sometimes in order to get advice or find out about a new malware that was reported; sometimes to promote sales of a tool or a service; and sometimes just to express feelings of frustration or to make a joke.

Taking into account the fact that Russian hackers often have difficulties with English, we found the phenomenon of referring English sources quite unexpected. Of course references to Russian sources dealing with security are seen as well, but far less than English ones.

Indisputably, the most famous “good guy” on Russian forums is Brian Krebs, a journalist who reports about the cyber-crime world. Links to his posts regarding different types of malware are very common on the forums, and catching his attention is considered a sales promotion act among malware vendors. For example, on one of the forum discussions regarding the sale of malware called “PowerLoader“, one of the repliers advices the seller to leak the malware files to Brian Krebs, “and this will be bring him a lot of clients, after Krebs will write a post about the powerful Russian hackers.” Another less delightful mention of Krebs’ name pertains to hackers’ concerns about infiltration of foreign impostors trying to obtain information or incriminate the forum members. Thus, every post written in English and not in Russian tends to be suspicious and the writer is contemptuously called “Krebsenish“.

The blog “Malware don’t need Coffee” dealing mostly with malware undoubtedly originates in the Russian underground as the author is embedded on some forums, is also well known to Russian forum members. The author is called Caffeine, and links to his malware/vulnerability reviews are frequently posted on them. The funny part of this is that sometimes a forum member uploads a post and instead of describing details or uploading images, he just gives a link to a post in the above-mentioned blog (that quotes another Russian source in more details).

One more Western celebrity among Russian hackers is the French blogger Xylibox, whose blog is dedicated to malware technical analysis. It should be mentioned that the blog is treated with respect and seriousness among the forums members, and is often cited in professional discussions and the sale of malware.

As we can see, the Russian underground is interested in the opposite side at least as much as the opposite side is interested in it. The forum members follow security sites and blogs, try to stay updated with the latest news and trends, and refer to them in their illegal malware sale business. Perhaps their life becomes even easier when someone else does all the marketing for them?!

References to the Brian Krebs and Xylitol blogs on the Russian underground
References to the Brian Krebs and Xylibox blogs on the Russian underground

Hacking as an Artistic Expression

Hackers are creative people. Everybody knows that. They have to be technically creative in order to outsmart security mechanisms, perform their antics and get away without being caught (sometimes).
But artistic creativity? Not the first thing we associate with hacking. However, after witnessing their creative works of art, we felt compelled to share these with you.
So you are welcome to enjoy the works of the “Russian classical painters”, the “surrealist hacktivists designers” and the “Iranian masters”:

A Russian hacking forum
A Russian hacking forum
Portal of Russian hackers
Portal of Russian hackers
Another Russian hacking forum
Another Russian hacking forum
A carding shop
A carding shop
#OpUSA (May 7, 2013)
#OpUSA (May 7, 2013)
#OpPetrol (June 20, 2013)
#OpPetrol (June 20, 2013)
#OpEgypt
#OpEgypt
Iranian Cyber Army (ICA)
Iranian Cyber Army (ICA)
Ashiyane Digital Security Team (ADST)
Ashiyane Digital Security Team (ADST)