Verint’s powerful portfolio of interception and monitoring solutions provides full monitoring and operational value. Dedicated systems address separate real-time and retroactive investigation needs, for lawful monitoring, field operations and background research. In the case below, we have used our Cyber and Webint suite to constantly monitor, collect and analyze malware-related items, to gain actionable intelligence and perform the investigation. Continue reading “Sharp Rise in Mining-Related Malware on the Russian-speaking Underground”
According to a recently published report for the first quarter of 2017, there has been a significant rise in consumer and enterprise accounts in the Cloud. As more and more organizations migrate to the Cloud, the frequency and sophistication of Cloud-based attacks is growing. Continue reading “Significant Increase in Cloud-Based Attacks in the Last Year”
While monitoring closed platforms that propagate an Islamic State agenda, we detected an initial interest in hacking lessons, focusing on spam and phishing methods. Many discussions in the technical sections of closed platforms affiliated with the Islamic State deal with the implementation of Continue reading “Jihadi Cybercrime (Increasing Interest in Spam and Phishing Methods on Closed Islamic State Platforms)”
New Smartphone technologies have made our lives easier. At the touch of a button, you can call a cab, pay bills, connect with your friends and even reach your personal trainer. On the other hand, the world of hacking and cracking now also has a lot of useful tools to hack your system and steal your data, using a smartphone.
We have recently seen the development and publishing of hack applications for smartphones on underground forums. The wide range of such tools means that anybody can find a suitable tool for dubious purposes. The items available include a variety of DDoS tools, wireless crackers, sniffers, network spoofers and more.
Most tools are only available for Android smartphones, and many require root permissions. The most popular tool for cookie theft is DroidSheep. With the help of this tool, an attacker can collect all browsing data, including logins, passwords and more, merely by using the same Wi-Fi network as the victim.
Moreover, the attacker can connect to the victim’s password-protected Wi-Fi network. There are several Wi-Fi cracking tools, for example, WIBR+ uses uploaded password databases to identify passwords common to the victim’s network. The users can also upload and update these databases. Another tool – Wi-Fi Kill – is capable of shutting down any other device connected to the same network and can intercept pictures and webpages recently visited by users of this network.
More and more tools now include more than one hacking capability. The DSploit tool features such functions as password sniffers, cookie sniffers, browsing history sniffers, and webpage redirecting. Another program, Bugtroid, contains cracking and protection applications. The owner can choose the most suitable program from a list and install it in one click. The tool offers a variety of tools to suit almost every cracking purpose.
For iOS systems, there is a limited number of hacking tools, mostly in the realm of game cracking. Examples of such tools are GameGem and iGameGuardian. These tools break games for the purpose of stealing monetary units. The most common tool for iOS is Metasploit, which contains a number of useful applications for different fields.
The tools presented above are not new, but they represent the main capabilities in the field. We are seeing a growing tendency to use portable devices, such as smartphones and tablets, to conduct attacks in public places. Mobile devices and public Wi-Fi networks tend to be less protected and more vulnerable. With the help of collected data by mobile device, the attackers can perform more complex attacks via PC. As long as there is no protection awareness regarding mobile devices, we expected a continued increase in the number of smartphone-based attacks.
The rise in scamming campaigns has become a focal issue for the InfoSec world in recent years. More and more attacks have been targeting everyone from large corporates, by using specific techniques “tailored” for the target, to simple users, by spreading it to anyone available. The platforms from which the malware is spread vary from standard email messages and social networks to more complicated SMS scams.
We will attempt to describe herein the basic steps to take to determine if a suspicious email, text message or Facebook post is actually malicious – in order to stay safe from falling victim, while still being able to keep up with the latest 9GAG spam.
When receiving a new email or text message, check who the sender is. If the message comes from an unknown person – a source you are not expecting contact from or a strange looking email name – do not open it! Browsing social networks like Twitter can also lead you to malicious actors that will try to lure innocents and curious people.
One such example is a reservation email scam that “accidentally” sends a room reservation email to you instead of the hotel manager. The email has an attachment, purportedly containing a list of special requirements for the guests, which turns out to be a malicious element that downloads additional executable malware.
We have all heard the joke about receiving a scam email from a Nigerian prince, where the victim is asked to provide their bank account details in order to receive a large sum of money, but reality is not so far off. Attackers use sophisticated techniques to capture your attention, be it by intimidation, exploiting the latest trending topic or informing you of a transaction.
The recent iCloud hacking leak scandal has been a hot topic on the Internet, and the phishing attacks soon followed. The tweet, which tries to grab your attention by sharing a link to the alleged nude video of Jennifer Laurence, redirects visitors to a download page for a video converter. Of course, the downloaded file turned out to be adware, not to mention the fact that it forces its victims to share the malicious site on their Facebook profiles.
I believe that the easiest way to observe that something about a message of any kind is wrong is bad grammar. Foreign scammers who are not fluent in target audience languages encounter a barrier that they try to bypass by using online translators or just trying their luck at translating the message on their own. A poorly written letter from a formal organization or a shifty looking website should definitely raise a red flag.
Apart from the content itself, the message might also contain links. The URL that appears in the text might seem legitimate, but it is important to get a closer look at the domain name, in addition to ‘hovering’ over the link with a mouse to see if the actual web address is compatible with the one presented to you (for other fake-link-finding techniques, see our previous post).
Let’s say you received an email from the human resources department in your company – Sounds like a legitimate item to open. But what if it contains a link to download CryptoWall ransomware? In this particular situation, it is very difficult to distinguish whether this is phishing scam, but by taking a closer look at the shared link, you can notice if it redirects you to a gaming website and forces you to download a suspicious ZIP file that contains the malware.
Some scammers direct you to open files attached to their message. They might appear legitimate because they are Word or ZIP files, but they end up being disguised malware. Be aware of attachments you are not expecting to receive, especially executable files like .EXE, .PIF, .JAR, .BAT and .REG.
Curiosity killed the cat, and apparently also some people’s computers. An innocent-looking email suggesting that you view someone’s new photo contains an attachment called photo.zip, which unfortunately does not contain an attractive person’s selfie, but rather a Zbot Trojan.
And just like the old Japanese saying goes “Attack a man with a phish and you’ll scam him for a day; Teach a man to phish and you keep him safe for a lifetime.”
LinkedIn is a terrific platform to cultivate business connections. It is also rife with fraud and deceit. Fraudsters use as a social engineering tool which allows them to connect to professionals, trying to lure them into disclosing their real contact details (work email is the best) and then use this email address to send spam, or worse, deliver malware.
Always check the profile before accepting an invitation, and do so via the LinkedIn message mechanism and not viaemail (fake invitation emails can cause much more harm than fake profiles – see our previous post).
So we have established that it is imperative to be able to identify a fake profile when someone invites you to connect on LinkedIn. But how would you do that? Follow our proprietary (just made up) CID protocol! CID stands for – Connections, Image and Details. By following it, you will be able to spot most fakes in 60 seconds or less. For more elaborate fraud attempts, it will be much longer or maybe even impossible for the non- professional to identify. We will discuss these later.
Connections – while you can fabricate any “fact” on your profile, connections cannot be faked; they have to be “real” LinkedIn users who have agreed to connect with you. So unless the fraudster is willing to create 100 other fake profiles, and connect these with the fake persona he is trying to solidify (something that takes a lot of time and effort to do, and something I hope the LinkedIn algorithm will pick up), the only way for him to have 100 connections is to connect to 100 LinkedIn users. So if you see someone with a puny number of connections, you can start to be more suspicious. So, connections number check – 5 seconds. Moving on.
Image – by now most people creating a LinkedIn profile realize that it is in their best interest to include a real image of themselves, and usually a professionally looking one (either taken by a professional or in professional attire). So no image or an obscure one is kind of suspicious. Also, any too good-looking images should ring an alarm bell. Since it is almost certain that the fraudster will not use his/hers own image (by that they will make the profile real to a certain extent), they will most likely search for a nice photo to post online. How can you tell if the image they have used is taken from someplace else? There are dedicated websites for reverse image searching, but since we are under serious time constraints here, why not simply right-click the image and ask Google to check the source? Very quickly it will find a compatible image and you can match the profile image to an existing stock image. Another 25 seconds gone. Say these two tests were insufficient and you are still not sure? Check the Details.
Starting Google image search
Details – people know that the more detailed their profile is, the better. Profiles lacking education or occupation details are very unreliable, along with these are any severe discrepancies: How could this guy study at Yale and serve overseas at the same time? lack of skills, recommendations and endorsements are not in favor of any real profile. Taking another 30 seconds of your precious time, you should by now be able to spot a fake profile.
Sure, someone just starting on LinkedIn might have fit our CID protocol while actually just launching his LinkedIn profile, and therefore has few connections. If you know this guy, go ahead and connect. If you do not, it is best to wait until the profile seems more robust.
It is very important to note that accepting the invitation to connect by itself (given it was delivered via a LinkedIn message mechanism or clicked on the user profile) does not create any damage, but it establishes a link between you and a fraudster, which can later be utilized as an attack vector.
Oh, and if you have 30 more seconds, why not do everyone a favor and report the fraudster? LinkedIn allows you to report suspicious profiles for review.
Simply click the “Block or Report” option, fill the short form and there you go.
the profile displayed in this article is an actual fake profile who tried to connect to one of our analysts. Busted!
The #OpSaveGaza Campaign was officially launched on July 11, 2014, as a counter-reaction to operation “Protective Edge”. This is the third military operation against Hamas since the end of December 2008, when Israel waged operation “Cast Lead”, followed by operation “Pillar of Defense” in November 2012.
These military operations were accompanied by cyber campaigns emanating from pro-Palestinian hacker groups around the world. #OpSaveGaza was not the only recent cyber campaign against Israel, but it is the most organized, diverse and focused. During this campaign, hacker groups from Malaysia and Indonesia in the East to Tunisia and Morocco in the West have been participating in cyber attacks against Israel.
The Use of Social Networks
Hacktivist groups recruit large masses for their operations by means of social networks. Muslim hacker groups use mostly Facebook and Twitter to upload target lists, incite others to take part in cyberattacks and share attack tools.
The #OpSaveGaza campaign was planned and organized using these two social media platforms. The organizers of the campaign succeeded in recruiting tens of thousands of supporters to their anti-Israel ideology.
When examining the types of attacks perpetrated against Israeli cyber space, it appears that this campaign has been the most diverse in terms of attack vectors. It not only includes simple DDoS, defacement and data leakage attacks, but also phishing (even spear-phishing based on leaked databases), SMS spoofing and satellite hijacking (part of the Hamas psychological warfare), in addition to high-volume/high-frequency DDoS attacks.
Furthermore, these attacks have been much more focused as the attackers attempt to deface and knock offline governmental websites, defense contractors, banks and energy companies. Simultaneously, a large number of small and private websites were defaced (over 2,500) and several databases were leaked online.
Motivation and the Involvement of other Threat Actors
The motivation for waging cyberattacks against Israel during a military operation is clear. This is not the first time that a physical conflict has had implications on the cyber sphere. However, we believe that other factors are contributing to the cyber campaign. In July 2014, the Muslim world observed the month of Ramadan, a holy month in Muslim tradition. There are two significant dates in this month – “Laylat al-Qadr” (the Night of Destiny), the night the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad; and “Quds Day” (Jerusalem Day), an annual event held on the last Friday of Ramadan and mentioned specifically by Iran and Hezbollah. We identified an increase in the number of attacks, as well as their quality, surrounding these dates.
Last year, several days before “Quds Day” a hacker group named Qods Freedom, suspected to be Iranian, launched a massive cyber operation against Israeli websites. In other words, we believe that not only hacktivist elements participated in this campaign but also cyber terrorism units and perhaps even state-sponsored groups from the Middle East.
To summarize, this campaign was far better organized than the recent cyber operations we experienced in 2009 and 2012 alongside physical conflicts with Hamas. We have seen changes in several aspects:
- Improvement in attack tools and technical capabilities
- Information-sharing between the groups (targets, attack tools, tutorials)
- The involvement of hacker groups from Indonesia in the East and Morocco in the West.
- Possible involvement of cyber terrorism groups
- Well-managed psychological warfare and media campaign by the participating groups
The scope and manner in which this campaign was conducted shows improved capabilities of the perpetrators, which is in-line with Assaf Keren’s assessment of the evolution of hacktivist capabilities.
We have recently encountered a more elaborate phishing scheme, one which includes cleverly hidden links.
Some days ago we received an email titled “American Express has an important update for you”. Funny, I don’t recall having an AMEX account… and the email from which the message was sent from was all to suspicious and not connected to AMEX: [communication.4abr7w64haprabracrafray552dreste[at]azurewebsites.net].
Still, I kept reading the message which was all about the new anti-SPAM law:
Effective July 20, 2014, United State’s new anti-spam law comes into effect and American Express wants to ensure that your representative will be able to continue sending you emails and other electronic messages without any interruptions. In addition to messages from your representative, we may also send you other electronic messages, including but not limited to newsletters and surveys as well as information, offers, and promotions regarding our products and services or those of others that we believe you might be interested in (“Electronic Messages”).
The next paragraph contained a request to click an “I Agree” link to express consent to receiving Electronic Messages from AMEX.
The hyperlink points to bit.ly address. Here’s the catch.
We all know that by hovering above a suspicious link we can usually see where it points to, and this is usually different than the link itself (the link could say “americanexpress.com” but hovering above it will show the real address “russianspammers.ru”).
So in this case we cannot simply identify the destination of the link. What can we do?
Simple. Just paste the link address in getlinkinfo.com (or similar service), and voila, you can see the original link (and in this case, with a warning attached).
So other than the cynical use of anti-SPAM email to actually promote SPAM, the sender cleverly hides the real address inside a URL shortening service, making it more difficult to detect for the unsuspecting eye.
In recent months, we have noticed a phishing campaign designed to steal email credentials.
In this campaign, the crook creates a fake email account or uses an email account that has been breached, and sends an email where the recipient is asked to click on a link that redirects to a phishing site.
The email asks you to click on the link to view a document via Google Docs. However, following the link transfers the victim to a phishing site that requests that you login with your email address and password. Thus the login details are stolen and transferred to the attacker.
On entering this page, a message states: “To View shared document you are required to login with your email address below.” Pressing on one of the email service providers activates a pop-up window asking you to enter your email address and password:
In this manner, the victim provides the attacker with full access to his email account, allowing him to view correspondence, extract sensitive information and continue disseminating such phishing emails to potential victims. The best way to mitigate this type of threat is simply to hover with the mouse over the “Click here” link. If the link is not Google Docs, do not click on it.
Have you ever received a suspicious looking email, urging you to send money or provide your banking account details to someone you don’t know? Sure you have.
This is one of the Internet’s most common scams, and it has many names – “Phishing”, “advanced fee fraud”, “Nigerian sting” or 419 Scam (this name refers to the article of the Nigerian Criminal Code dealing with fraud).
The logic is simple – send numerous phishing emails, and you can expect that at least some people will be gullible enough to provide you with money or banking details. When you send millions of emails even a meagre return percentage is enough to generate hefty sums. But there’s a catch – most people are by now aware of this and are reluctant to reply or even open emails which do not appear to have been sent from a known acquaintance or organization. So 419 scammers have to evolve in order to survive. One way of doing so is utilizing social networks, and especially LinkedIn, since people tend to see it as a professional network and trust information and requests to connect which originate there.
Enter the “Total Sting”.
The story is simple yet entails great sophistication and creativity. As a LinkedIn member you one day notice a lucrative job opening – Total oil, one of the leading oil and gas companies are looking to opening new offices at your country and are recruiting a senior project manager.
You submit your application via LinkedIn and a few days later you receive a formal looking email from Gérard Lamarche at Total HR Dept. (even the email address looks legit: firstname.lastname@example.org). Out of curiosity you check who this gentlemen is and find that he is a director at Total (http://total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/20120116-appointment-gerard-lamarche-director-total-sareplacing-thierry-rudder).
Now comes the fun part. The email includes three attachments. Since you know that this is a reply email to a submission you’ve sent you don’t hesitate to open these PDF files. There’s a very attractive job description document, an officially looking invitation for an interview in London and another letter describing the technicalities of the interview. You are cordially invited to come to London and interview for the lucrative job at Total Recruitment offices, Human Resources department, TOTAL UK Limited, 40 Clarendon Road, Watford, Hertfordshire WD17 1TQ.
Out of curiosity you Google the address and find that this is indeed the official address of Total in the UK. There’s only one catch – you need to make the travel arrangements through a specific agency (but don’t worry, you will be reimbursed upon arrival). The contact person’s name is Dr. Kenneth Cole (hmmm) and the travel agency name is Belair travel and tours (located at Air Malta House, 314-316 Upper Richmond Rd, London SW1). Now things are looking a little more suspicious.
You decide to look more carefully into this. You phone the number but there is no answer. You check the website of the company, located in east Kensington, London, and find that they are using completely different phone numbers. ( http://www.belleair.co.uk/contactbelleair).
You search a little more on the web and immediate see that this is indeed a scam. (http://www.419baiter.com/_scam_emails/01-08/419_emails_total-oil-company-job-scam.html).
So you were just one of many lured into a simple phishing scam? Not quite.
This is an evolution of the classic 419, and this is why: the perpetrators of this specific scam have done almost everything possible to overcome the identifiable pitfalls of Phishing emails.
This scam is reactive, it is targeted at specific audience, it is officially looking and does not ask directly for money or details in advanced. Someone had to create a fake company profile on LinkedIn, post an authentically looking position, receive and read emails, fabricate authentically looking documents (complete with logo and an actual executive name), enter the job seeker name into the documents title and send it all back. And since this is a reply to an email/job submission the recipient is much more likely to open and perhaps respond. The logical evolution to this scam is that the scammers will create a false website (which will appear completely real) and let you submit your details there, making this fraud almost perfect.
I would like to Thank Itay and Tanya who shared this with me and assisted me in describing this in detail.
P.S. we checked and the PDF files were not weaponized (i.e. carrying Malware). had they been, this would have been a Spear-phishing campaign and a darn good one too.
P.s. 2. if you ever notice this type of scam please notify the good people of LinkedIn at email@example.com (we have).